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PTINS

Burnt Ends
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Posts posted by PTINS

  1. 8 hours ago, MagicSoccerSpray said:

    Who's in Guyana?

    Operated by ExxonMobil Guyana Limited (45%), with Chevron Corporation (30%) and CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Company, 25%) as partners

    7 hours ago, atomheartbevo said:

    it’s amazing that Trump assumed these companies will rush to invest billions in projects that won’t pay off until long after he’s in office. Almost like he didn’t talk to them beforehand or thinks it’s like some real estate development deal that can be finished in a few years or something.

    I can't see this happening.

    These are OIL COMPANIES, "Big Oil", the scourge of mankind, the reason for everything bad in your life.

    They are publicly traded companies, with institutional investors and pension funds, and every regulatory agency known to man looking over their shoulders on everything they do.

    Staying within the law is kind of a biggie.

    Their prudent planning and management, with a Wall Street approved capital expenditure program, has allowed them to ride out the storm from oil prices dropping by 50% in 3 years. There response was to producer more oil the old fashioned way; they bought it form somebody else they bought out the other companies. I'm kidding, but not really. The Permian development is an ideal play that can be ramped up and down very fairly quickly, within reason. Starting idle rigs is easy. Building new rigs takes a lot longer.

    Oil companies don't have the kind of cash reserves that tech companies have; (i) they aren't that big, and (ii) that is asking for government intervention.

    Will the federal government dictate public companies take government money and spend it on a flyer? Seems like they did something like that before.

    Giving banks money to loan to consumers is a bit different than forcing them to invest moneys on a high risk venture with a 5-10 year investment profile and 10-20 year payout period. BP's one well "Oops!!" cost them ~ $60 Billion; Are the feds going to backstop that possibility? Not to mention, similar assets have been nationalized before. Twice.

    There is nothing from this administration that points towards a comprehensive discussion with the principle players, before they pulled the trigger.

    Kidnapping Maduro was the easy part. Now what?

  2. 6 hours ago, atomheartbevo said:

    Oh, and before American oil companies go in there, we probably should, and I'm just spitballin' here, we can workshop the details later on, but I think we should probably secure the country first. We start sending in oilfield workers and engineers without, I dunno, having boots on the ground, well I don't think it will end well.

    And that's putting aside the fact that it's not really our business to help companies deal with really bad decisions on where they invested in the first place.

    Amazon.com: Hellfighters : John Wayne, Katharine Ross, Jim Hutton, Vera  Miles, Jay C. Flippen, Bruce Cabot, Edward Faulkner, Barbara Stuart, Edmund  Hashim, Valentin de Vargas, Andrew V. McLaglen: Movies & TV

    " ...we should probably secure the country first..."

    YARN | Well, hey, good luck with that. | Moneyball (2011) | Video clips by  quotes | e64718bd | 紗

    6 hours ago, Chopper said:

    I know little about the oil business but isn't Venezuela's oil considered very low quality to the point where it makes no sense to extract it at current prices? Makes me think this is more about creating a diversion from the Epstein files and for fascism to flex its muscles for domestic purposes.

    "Current prices" are not the same for everybody. The component of US oil & gas production costs attributable to taxes, our litigious society and insurance costs, and safety and environmental costs are not issues with most other countries. Other countries net a much higher percentage of the current price than US companies realize.

    The US is different in that if you drill, you have more oil. If you don't drill, it declines at 15-20% per year. We have already been through the primary, secondary and tertiary phases of oil recovery, and are back to the primary phase, on steroids this time.

    Venezuela has arguably the highest oil reserves in the world. Current production is ~ 600,000 BPD v. a peak of ~ 3,600,000 BPD.

    ~ 3,000,000 BPD x $75/bbl x 365 = $82 Billion/year, with a "B"

    Put me in the, "What the fuck are we doing?" column. This is 100% political BS. And whatever the Donald does, will be undone, when he is gone.

    But it's hard as hell getting the toothpaste back in the tube

    6 hours ago, atomheartbevo said:

    My dad said something about we have refineries that could handle that oil.

    Trump at least spent a lot of time talking about taking the oil. At least he’s not hiding it.

    5 hours ago, 956 Worldwide said:

    Our Gulf Coast refineries are specifically built to refine it.

    A large part of the US refining Industry was "retooled" in the 80'-90's to refine a slate of heavy, sour crude from Mexico & Canada, Venezuela, and other places.

    Most of what I knew about Venezuela's oil industry I forgot about about 20 years ago. Here is a graph of their historical oil production:

    Focus: How Venezuela pulled its oil production out of a tailspin | Reuters

    Some key dates:

    1970 Venezuela oil production peaks at over 3.5 MMBPD

    1976 Nationalization of the Venezuelan oil industry, creating Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA, "ped-e-vesa") , the state-owned oil and gas company of Venezuela.

    1984 Oil production dropped to ~1.5 MMBPD after the nationalization.

    1995 Oil production increases to over 3 MMBPD with sharing agreements w/ western oil companies. PDVSA & partners was an efficient partnership.

    2002 Chávez, crippling and bleeding PDVSA to fund his social agenda, resulted in PDVSA employees going on strike, starting the decay of the domestic industry.

    2007, PDVSA's renationalization program; Assets of ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were expropriated in 2007 after they declined to restructure their holdings to give PDVSA majority control; Total, Chevron, Statoil and BP agreed and retained minority shares in their Venezuelan projects. Basically, the western companies started heading towards the exits.

    2016 @PTINS pushed away from the table and moves home to Austin. Okay, not sure what caused the precipitous drop, but it coincides with the shale boom in the Permian, led by Chevron, Exxon & Conoco.

    Though the US production volumes are sufficient to meet domestic demand, the US exports ~ 3.5 MMBPD of light crude oil and imports similar quantities of heavy crude oil.

    EIA: Record U.S. Crude Exports - Fuels Market News

    The renationalization in 2007, after western oil companies had spent $$$$ to rebuild the oil industry, did not sit well with a lot of people.

    Exxon and Conoco, sued, and won, I think, but I doubt either of them ever received anything back.

    3 hours ago, Updawg said:

    How fucked is Texas if gas drops below $1?

    I think federal, state and local taxes will prevent that from happening.

    Whatever has caused the decline in oil production down to 500,000 BPD, it won't come back by simply opening a valve. The oil is heavy and sour, and requires significant investment and time to reverse the decline. Please note the fresh air equipment John Wayne is wearing. The oil & gas has high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide; extremely toxic, like one breath and you die.

    The big US companies are the largest producers in the Permian Basin, the shooting fish in a barrel Permian Basin; the same companies that got fucked, and then fucked again by Venezuela. I can't see them hurrying up and doing anything in V, even if they could. They have all made huge acquisitions in the past few years, are consolidating operations, and have had large staff reductions in the past few years, all under the umbrella of oil prices that are half of what they were 3 years ago.

    Nobody, not the US, the Saudi's, Russia, nor OPEC, are wanting to see a flood of oil coming from Venezuela any time soon.

    I expect there will continue to be upheaval in the world market, but not from an increase in Venezuela oil production.

  3. On 1/1/2026 at 11:15 AM, closetojumping said:

    It actually is. Juggs reps, one-handed reps, and jump ball reps can and do drive more proficiency for catching the ball. I found myself wondering this year if Texas was doing any of that and how often, but surely they are. The offseason will hopefully include a crazy amount of that work as well as cut and quickness drills.

    Having the dropsies can also be psychological for a player, sort of like a RB with a fumbling problem. That shit can change for a WR from one season to another if that is the problem.

    On 1/1/2026 at 1:51 PM, Tex-19 said:

    Sure doesn't seem like they're doing enough of this. Not only the drops but 50/50 balls are more like 10/90 with Texas WRs this year. It's been driving me crazy watching the WRs from Indiana and other CFP teams routinely make those difficult catches.

    Mosely is the only one with ball skills this year (maybe Lockett, TBD). Last year Golden had them and Bond was ok.

    edit: probably worth adding that a lot of this is stuff the players can practice on their own. Get a GA or walkon and have them feed you balls. I wonder how much time these guys are spending on it outside of mandatory practice.

    I think Texas had 5 drops in the first half, Parker and Wingo with 2 each.

    Those guys should be carrying a football with them every place they go.

  4. ·

    Edited by PTINS
    typo. text.

    5 hours ago, Nicole44 said:

    🥺😢😭🤘🏼🤘🏼🤘🏼

    IMG_9826.jpeg

    "CATCH THE FUCKING BALL!!!!!!!"

    Was this after the 1st or 2nd drop, before halftime? The fucking announcers blamed Arch for the pass being a little off target after 40+ yards, but it still hit both of PL's hands.

    Wingo also had two 1st half drops.

    Neither should have played after that.

  5. 55 minutes ago, Tex-19 said:

    NashTalksTexas on X pointed out some interesting stats re: Coleman.

    Coleman had 1 fewer drop than Wingo on 5 fewer catchable balls. So pretty similar rate.

    Coleman had lower YAC and yards per route run.

    But Coleman significantly more air yards.

    Lines up with what CTJ has been saying about Coleman not being some drastic improvement. Idk how they compare last year.

    On Colemans' highlight reel, most of his first few are contested catches going high up in the air to get the ball. I think Wingo had 1 catch where he went high to get it, and it was uncontested with no one anywhere close to him.

    I don't think Wingo even knew that going up to get the ball was allowed until he saw Arch do it. He may be the fastest runner on the team, but nowhere close to being a great receiver.

  6. 27 minutes ago, KYHorn said:

    BREAKING: POLICE OFFICERS WHO TORTURED UKRAINIAN POWS BLOWN UP IN MOSCOW 

    According to one version, an unidentified man threw an explosive device into the window of a police vehicle. 

    Two officers were killed on the spot, two more are in critical condition. The attacker also died.

    The eliminated Russians had previously fought against Ukraine. There is also evidence that they were involved in the torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war.

    This was reported by RBC-Ukraine, citing sources in Ukraine’s military intelligence

    image.png.6969079b814bbfb7f8227dbca0695894.png

  7. ·

    Edited by PTINS
    new info

    22 minutes ago, Chad Fuck said:


    Link?

    BBC; Russian general killed by car bomb in Moscow, officials say

    A Russian general has been killed in a car bombing in Moscow, officials have said.

    Russia's Investigative Committee said Lt Gen Fanil Sarvarov died on Monday morning after an explosive device planted under a car detonated.

    He is the third military official to have been killed in bomb attacks in the Russian capital over the last year.

    Sarvarov, 56, was the head of the armed forces' operational training department, the committee said.


    It added one theory being investigated was that the bomb was planted with the involvement of Ukrainian intelligence services. Ukraine has not commented.

    Sarvarov died in hospital as a result of his injuries, the committee said, adding it had opened an investigation into murder and illegal trafficking of explosives.

    Investigators have been sent to the scene, in a car park near an apartment block in the south of Moscow.

    Images from the area show a badly damaged white Kia Sorento with the doors blown out, surrounded by other vehicles.

    According to Russian media, Sarvarov previously took part in combat operations during the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and the Chechen wars in the 1990s and early 2000s, and also led operations in Syria between 2015-2016.

    Reuters Investigators work near a destroyed car after a blast from an explosive deviceReuters
    Investigators could be seen working at the scene on Monday morning

    Vladimir Putin was informed of Sarvarov's death immediately, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.

    Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a number of military officials and high-profile individuals have been targeted in the Russian capital.

    Darya Dugina, the 29-year-old daughter of a prominent nationalist figure and Putin close ally, was killed in a suspected car bombing in 2022.

    Gen Yaroslav Moskalik was killed in a car bomb attack last April, while Gen Igor Kirillov died in December 2024 when a device hidden in a scooter was detonated remotely.

    A Ukrainian source later told the BBC that Kirillov was killed by Ukraine's security service, though this was never confirmed on the record. As a matter of policy, Ukraine never officially admits or claims responsibility for targeted attacks.

    AP; Car bomb kills Russian general in Moscow

    MOSCOW (AP) — A car bomb killed a Russian general on Monday, the third such killing of a senior military officer in just over a year. Investigators said Ukraine may be behind the attack.

    Lt. Gen. Fanil Sarvarov, head of the Operational Training Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces’ General Staff, died from his injuries, said Svetlana Petrenko, the spokesperson for Russia’s Investigative Committee, the nation’s top criminal investigation agency. He was 56.

    “Investigators are pursuing numerous lines of inquiry regarding the murder. One of these is that the crime was orchestrated by Ukrainian intelligence services,” Petrenko said.

    Since Moscow sent troops into Ukraine nearly four years ago, Russian authorities have blamed Kyiv for several assassinations of military officers and public figures in Russia. Ukraine has claimed responsibility for some of them. It has not yet commented on Monday’s death.

  8. Just now, PTINS said:

    I'm not that familiar with the European gas market (I don't have tome to go down that rabbit hole), so i'm not exactly sure what gas price is shown in the graph. 

    But my first guess is that is an apples and boxcars comparison.

    Below is a similar plot of US gas prices, with no indication of the source of the data. Directionally, it appears to be valid information, but the entities that have the trading data also tend to have an agenda, so beware. 

    image.png.5c64339920f7d6fd2611b46e8786e68b.png

    If you over lay the two plots, they are similar, which one might conclude that US and European prices are the same.

    In one sense they are, but in reality, they are very different. The US has 100's (1,000's) of supply points and 1,000's of delivery points, with 1000's of transactions reflected in the gas spot market price at a specific point in time. In the US, the paper price is indicative of the real price. By comparison, mainland Europe (Not the UK and Norway) has a much smaller gas market, with minimal native gas supplies, and fewer, and larger delivery points. In the one sense, it is also a valid price, but I expect the volumes transacted at that price on a daily basis is but a small fraction of the US volumes

    From the graph, one might conclude the US and European prices are similar, so why do they need to import LNG? Well without LNG, that gas price goes off the chart.

     I asked Google, "What is the delivered cost of LNG to Europe?"

    (Again, directionally, the answer and information is within reason.)

    "AI Overview

    The delivered cost of LNG to Europe in late 2024/early 2025 typically ranges from $10–$15/MMBTU, but varies significantly with market conditions, adding liquefaction, shipping, and regasification costs to the base gas price (like U.S. Henry Hub).

    Factors like high Henry Hub prices, increased demand, and freight rates pushed delivered prices up in late 2024, while cooler weather and ample storage can lower them, with prices sometimes hovering around 33–50 €/MWh (equivalent to $10–$15/MMBTU) at the Dutch TTF hub. 

    Cost Breakdown:
    Base Gas (e.g., U.S. Henry Hub): ~$3–4/MMBTU (in early 2025 estimates).
    Liquefaction: ~$2–$3.50/MMBTU (fees for turning gas into LNG).
    Shipping (Freight): Highly variable, $1–$3/MMBTU or more, depending heavily on distance and tanker demand.
    Regasification: ~$0.50–$1/MMBTU (cost to turn LNG back into gas in Europe). 
    Key Price Drivers:
    Henry Hub Price: The cost of gas at the source (US).
    Shipping Demand: Higher demand (like surges in winter) increases freight costs, widening the gap between source and delivered prices.
    European Storage Levels: Low storage levels and cold weather drive up European spot prices (TTF). 
    Recent Trends (Late 2024/Early 2025):
    Europe's high prices have attracted record U.S. LNG exports, even pushing prices above Asian markets.

    While U.S. Henry Hub prices rose, European spot prices (TTF) recently saw lower levels in late 2024 due to milder weather, though cold snaps can quickly reverse this, increasing costs. 

    In essence, it's a market driven by supply, demand, and transport economics, with U.S. LNG often costing significantly more in Europe than pre-2022 pipeline gas." 

    So, somebody is paying $10-15/MMbtu (3-4x the US gas cost) for the European gas price to be the "same" as the US.

    20 years ago, the US built LNG import terminals (at the beginning of the shale boom, which unlocked Appalachia gas). Some actually imported LNG. Most of them started up as LNG export terminals, without ever importing LNG. It wasn't as simple as switching two wires and reversing the polarity. It takes $ Billions of dollars, tons of paperwork, and a regulatory nightmare, all of which is at the whim of the current administration. The long haul gas pipelines from the Gulf Coast to the Northeast, were bifurcated, with Appalachia gas supplying both the Northeast US demand and a new Gulf Coast LNG export market.

    I'm responding to myself, but I didn't want to pollute my first response.  This is borderline CR, but still related to the topic.

    TLDR

    The US has tremendous natural gas resources, and Biden kicked the LNG industry (and O&G) in the 'nads. Trump reversed that mindset, 100%, throwing gasoline on the fire. 

    Gulp. Trump was right. I can't say it.

    The US should produce gas, make LNG and export it, and Europe is much closer and easier than SE Asia.

    But it will impact domestic gas prices. The next time Texas freezes for a week, who gets the little bit of gas still being produced? The sparks fly when the reality of the present day market gets in the face of long term contracts, and $$$. The answer is not binary, and it it not finished when the papers are signed. In is a huge, living, constantly changing beast, at it needs to be treated as such.

    DJT may be a self anointed real estate mogul, but I think he and his 2 minute attention span would get his ass handed to him trading energy commodities. To be fair, I think that also applies to most of our former Presidents.  I will never understand the pushback on putting energy professionals in the Department of Energy. 

    What happens with the next US administration? Back to the other extreme?

    Europe is replacing Russian natural gas with imported LNG, from the US, and other places.

    Europe will be dependent on the kind hand offered by the US.

    Kind'a like NATO was. How's that's working out for them?

    While looking for Russian refinery data, I saw some verbiage that Russia now flares more gas than any other country. It used to be between Iran and the US. 

    Russia I'm not sure if that includes Nordstream, but the number was close to the pipeline capacity, ~ 3-4 BCF/day, or ~ 1 or 2 LNG plants.

    When all is said and done, Russia has the gas production and reserves and the pipelines assets are already in place, and Russia SHOULD still be the cheapest source of gas for Europe. But Russia should never be the only source.

  9. 15 hours ago, atomheartbevo said:

    @PTINS

    Natural gas prices in Europe have all but returned to normal since Russia's full scale war in Ukraine. In fact, the only reason for the spike in 2021 and 2022 has been Russia's energy war against Europe, which started even before the full scale invasion of Ukraine. The numbers clearly say that. 

    It proves many things: Russian energy was never cheap, neither politically nor economically. Russian energy was always unreliable. Russia always needed Europe more than the other way around.

    I saw the downfall of Southstream.

    I saw the downfall of Nordstream. 

    And now the whole European market for Russian gas is getting buried.

    This is what I mean when I say that Russia is losing in the long run. All what you need is determination, patience and tenacity.

    The European market was the primary reason why Russia raked in so much money the last three decades.

    The European customers were reliable, paid well and were easily to access, who in turn put in a lot of investments into Russia. Now all of that is gone because of petty imperial ambitions of a short man who never accepted the downfall of the Soviet empire.

    Russia is now forced to sell oil and gas with huge price cuts, which barely covers processing costs while India and China completely suck out the last bits of life from Russia.

     

    14 hours ago, Chad Fuck said:

    Kinda like China and US soybeans!

    I'm not that familiar with the European gas market (I don't have tome to go down that rabbit hole), so i'm not exactly sure what gas price is shown in the graph. 

    But my first guess is that is an apples and boxcars comparison.

    Below is a similar plot of US gas prices, with no indication of the source of the data. Directionally, it appears to be valid information, but the entities that have the trading data also tend to have an agenda, so beware. 

    image.png.5c64339920f7d6fd2611b46e8786e68b.png

    If you over lay the two plots, they are similar, which one might conclude that US and European prices are the same.

    In one sense they are, but in reality, they are very different. The US has 100's (1,000's) of supply points and 1,000's of delivery points, with 1000's of transactions reflected in the gas spot market price at a specific point in time. In the US, the paper price is indicative of the real price. By comparison, mainland Europe (Not the UK and Norway) has a much smaller gas market, with minimal native gas supplies, and fewer, and larger delivery points. In the one sense, it is also a valid price, but I expect the volumes transacted at that price on a daily basis is but a small fraction of the US volumes

    From the graph, one might conclude the US and European prices are similar, so why do they need to import LNG? Well without LNG, that gas price goes off the chart.

     I asked Google, "What is the delivered cost of LNG to Europe?"

    (Again, directionally, the answer and information is within reason.)

    "AI Overview

    The delivered cost of LNG to Europe in late 2024/early 2025 typically ranges from $10–$15/MMBTU, but varies significantly with market conditions, adding liquefaction, shipping, and regasification costs to the base gas price (like U.S. Henry Hub).

    Factors like high Henry Hub prices, increased demand, and freight rates pushed delivered prices up in late 2024, while cooler weather and ample storage can lower them, with prices sometimes hovering around 33–50 €/MWh (equivalent to $10–$15/MMBTU) at the Dutch TTF hub. 

    Cost Breakdown:
    Base Gas (e.g., U.S. Henry Hub): ~$3–4/MMBTU (in early 2025 estimates).
    Liquefaction: ~$2–$3.50/MMBTU (fees for turning gas into LNG).
    Shipping (Freight): Highly variable, $1–$3/MMBTU or more, depending heavily on distance and tanker demand.
    Regasification: ~$0.50–$1/MMBTU (cost to turn LNG back into gas in Europe). 
    Key Price Drivers:
    Henry Hub Price: The cost of gas at the source (US).
    Shipping Demand: Higher demand (like surges in winter) increases freight costs, widening the gap between source and delivered prices.
    European Storage Levels: Low storage levels and cold weather drive up European spot prices (TTF). 
    Recent Trends (Late 2024/Early 2025):
    Europe's high prices have attracted record U.S. LNG exports, even pushing prices above Asian markets.

    While U.S. Henry Hub prices rose, European spot prices (TTF) recently saw lower levels in late 2024 due to milder weather, though cold snaps can quickly reverse this, increasing costs. 

    In essence, it's a market driven by supply, demand, and transport economics, with U.S. LNG often costing significantly more in Europe than pre-2022 pipeline gas." 

    So, somebody is paying $10-15/MMbtu (3-4x the US gas cost) for the European gas price to be the "same" as the US.

    20 years ago, the US built LNG import terminals (at the beginning of the shale boom, which unlocked Appalachia gas). Some actually imported LNG. Most of them started up as LNG export terminals, without ever importing LNG. It wasn't as simple as switching two wires and reversing the polarity. It takes $ Billions of dollars, tons of paperwork, and a regulatory nightmare, all of which is at the whim of the current administration. The long haul gas pipelines from the Gulf Coast to the Northeast, were bifurcated, with Appalachia gas supplying both the Northeast US demand and a new Gulf Coast LNG export market.

  10. My initial reaction was the subsea drone hit mostly the dock and less of the submarine. Maybe not.

    image.thumb.png.0bdd1bd3bc67e3e69fe816a4d2dd0494.png

    image.thumb.png.52f41a79675ac4d1990e10146e75be9f.png

    Per wiki, the Kilo Class submarine is 238-242 feet long, depending on the model.

    image.thumb.png.af79c02ff395f810ee8c3e83b1b7ea8f.png

     

     

    I merged a couple of screenshots of the submarines in the harbor, the targeted sub and a random sub at the dock.

    Bottom line, even though the videos show the explosion at the corner of the dock, it appears the attack may have inflicted more damage to the sub than what you can tell from the recent photos.

    The red line is ` 240 feet long

    Screenshot2025-12-18at9_32_52AM.png.1e6604b62d2026a66481f477dc91ae9e.png

     

  11. Re: The isolationist view of the US relative to the world.

    Nowhere is this view more impactful than the ignorance of the US, the people and the government, as it relates to oil and gas.

    The US put an oil embargo on Japan pre-1941, a country that was 100% dependent on imports.  They bombed the fuck out of us.

    The US was late to the party, but the first thing they did was go to Africa to stop Germany's rush to the Arabian oil fields.

    Prior to 1973, the US was by far, the technological leader in the industry, and the availability of cheap gas across the country was a reality, and an expectation, cause "were Americans".  No body cared that most of the oil came from foreign counties.

    The U.S. and other nations supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Saudi Arabia led OPEC in the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74, causing domestic oil prices to quadruple, from $3 to $12/bbl, triggering gas shortages, long lines at pumps, stagflation, and a major shift in global energy policy towards conservation and energy independence. (OPEC was modeled on the Texas Railroad Commission)

    In the US, conservation and energy independence took a back seat to blaming the domestic oil industry for something that happened half way around the world. Something they had no control, or influence over. The couldn't control oil prices, but they could control natural gas prices, a domestic industry.

    Government regulations controlled interstate gas prices, but not intrastate prices, eventually putting the producing states (Texas) at odds with consuming states (the Northeast).  

    The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was directed at the US, for harboring the Shah, a US/European puppet. Oil prices quadrupled again, to over $40/bbl. Guess who was to blame. Again.

    This was not all bad. The spread between unregulated oil prices and regulated gas prices gave the Gas Processing Industry, a margin based business, a boost like nothing before or since. In 1979, the O&G industry attracted the best and the brightest. The advice to "The Graduate" in 1967, a single word, came to fruition; "Plastics."

    As a country, we have been on a 50 year crusade to methodically dismantle the 150 year old domestic industry, in large part, because people just don't understand how it works, or even care.

    Though there are fewer US companies and much less competition, the domestic oil & gas production is higher than ever before, and the US is still the technological leader in the industry, we just have a lot less influence on world affairs.

    Which is what an Isolationist wants.

  12. 3 hours ago, scramblyn said:

    Long time lurker infrequent poster here but I’m fully convinced that once the war started and it became clear Russia was in a quagmire that the underlying US policy shifted to keep Russia occupied and to bleed them out slowly. Preventing escalation to even tactical nukes was a secondary motivation, but the benefits of snagging Russia in military and economic death spiral for a half to a full decade here make too much sense. The current admin waffles but I think inside the intelligence communities this still remains the message and causes said waffling in some cases to Ukraine’s favor.

    3 hours ago, Chad Fuck said:

    I agree to a large extent to this premise.  Certainly this was true under the Biden administration.  The bold part is my sincere hope - that there are people who are doing the right thing in between the lines who know that "this too shall pass."  

    2 hours ago, scramblyn said:

    Netflix has a solid Cold War documentary called turning point, ...

    semi related, I was shocked to see Russia refining capacity only knocked down 6% thus far. Meaningful but is it enough?

    all that to say, I’d put the over under on this conflict ending at 2 years from now and I could be convinced it’s longer.

    I’m curious what the intelligentsia on this thread thinks.

    "I’m curious what the intelligentsia on this thread thinks."

    I believe this thread is the most broad based, informative exchange of information I have been a party too, whether as a student, a professional in the work place, or a casual observer.

    My limited search capabilities within the thread are frustrating at times, because many of these individual tangents have been discussed at length, multiple times. An occasional refresh is welcomed, as new information becomes available based on the dynamics of a multifaceted war.

    As cumbersome as it may be, going back and reading older posts is beneficial, as most of the responses today are abbreviated versions of the more in depth analysis from previous posts.

    I'm guilty of same, as I have posted versions of the same thing many times. The fundamentals stay the same, but the particulars change constantly.

    With that said, a rereading of Tom Clancy's "The Bear and the Dragon" is on my holiday list.

    It has always made sense for Russia to be the main supplier of Oil and Gas to Europe and China. Always. It didn't happen until Russia joined the commercial side of the world and made a move to monetize their tremendous natural resources. Their oil & gas industry in many ways is in the same state as the Permian Basin was in the 50's-60's.  Well known, but virtually untapped.

    Russia played nice, negotiated the Nordstream gas contracts w/ Germany and western Europe, and the Sakhalin LNG contracts w/ Exxon, Shell & SE Asia, and opened the door for foreign investment to step in and monetize the resources. 

    And then, Russia's gonna Russia. They invaded Ukraine.

    At the end of the day, everybody has a price. Russia has available, exportable, relatively cheap Oil & Gas, and no safety or environmental constraints, and is void of a litigious society.   

    2 hours ago, atomheartbevo said:

    It's a lot more than that, but it's also tough to quantify (paging @PTINS ).  They are refining far less, but they are exporting far less, so they are close to staying even on being able to refine what they need internally.

    This is a decent breakdown. 

    https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/10/russia-refinery-damages?lang=en

    I don't think it was 38% (the article is probably right 38% was the upper range), but I wouldn't be surprised if it was in the 20s (only offset because they are exporting less). I don't think 2 years, but I think we will know how things will shake out over the next 6 months, because the tempo is such that Russia refining capacities are going to drop double-digits going forward and as more air defenses are destroyed/exhausted, we will see a lot more targets taken out.

    Re: Russia Energy

    When I throw my dart, I peg the Russian refining capacity reduction at ~ 20%.

    The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) is a great resource for all things energy. The data is very good, but it is not meant to be a near term analysis.

    Here is a link to their brief on Russia energy, as of 2024. 

    Country Analysis Brief: Russia Last Updated: July 24, 2025

    The 38% of Russian refining capacity offline mentioned by @atomheartbevo's reference in the Carnegie article was a simple calculation. Ukraine targeted and hit 38% of the refining capacity, so as much as 38% of the capacity might be offline.

    Even with the microscope focused on the US refining industry, getting near term data is hard, as the reporting is such that its better to give the actual data to the government later, rather than giving them preliminary data sooner.

    Refining capacity is a loose term. You might have 4 units built over the past 80 years that do basically the same thing. The capacity of all 4 is deemed to be the nameplate refinery capacity, when in reality, Unit 4 runs at 100%, Unit 3 runs at 75 %, Unit 2 runs at a variable rate based on demand, and Unit 1 basically mothballed.

    Refineries "make" more products than the crude they refine. There is a 1-3 % gain across the refinery. Crude oil is a mix of bb's, peas, marbles, ping pong balls, and tennis balls. Refined products are more like the purity components, so when you separate the molecules, the volumes "grow" as there are more empty voids between each ball. 

    A 400,000 BPD refinery would refine a train of tank cars 4 miles long, every day. Refineries have large storage capacities to insulate them from supply/demand disruptions, say a nominal 10 days of storage on each end; in this case, ~ 8,000,000 bbls of storage. One company may report net change to total storage volumes as "refining", where a second company would report actual refine inputs, and a third may report actual refined products made. I expect the data given to the EIA is consistent, but any reporting on industry trade reporting will be all over the board.

    The current state of Russian refining operating rates is a hard thing to pin down, even before the Ukraine invasion.

    Russian Nameplate Capacity is ~ 6,500,000 bbl/day (6.5 MM BPD), with a pre-war operating capacity of ~ 5.5 MM BPD, with ~ 17% of the capacity always offline. 

    Of the 5.5 MMBPD normal capacity, estimates of capacity reductions range from 0.5-2.0 MM BPD, or an operating capacity ranging from from 91 to 63%. Some of range could be the difference between October actual volumes v. December estimated throughput volume. 

    Ukraine has mentioned specific refinery columns that were targeted, but confirmation on exactly what was it, and how bad, is virtually non existent. Did they hit the pressure vessel or the lines connected to it? A breach of the large pressure vessel (10+ ft diameter) is normally a total loss, as these are ASME code vessels with non negotiable specifications.  That wold be a 6+ month replacement. In Russia, maybe they weld a plate over the hole and call it good.  That would take a few weeks or a month.

    Normally, Russia produces ~ 200% of their internal diesel demand, and ~ 130% of their gasoline demand, with considerably more exports of diesel than gasoline. On a short term daily/weekly basis, a specific refinery going off line may cause spot shortages. Over time, a refinery can change their operations to make more more gasoline and less diesel. 

    The US moves the majority of refined products (90+ % ??) via pipeline to a terminal, and trucks from the terminal to the gas stations. In Russia, other than Moscow and maybe St. Petersburg, most of the refined products appears to move by rail. I combination of a refinery attack, a storage depot attack, and a rail bridge attack in close proximity could cause a product shortage for some period of time.

  13. On 12/14/2025 at 4:09 PM, Gatorubet said:

    @PTINS - i’d love to hear your thoughts on a subject I know nothing about.   I find it interesting that the city of Angarsk in Siberia - a larger city of 200,000 residents - has been largely without any building heating since December 7.  This includes homes, apartments, hospitals, schools, etc.  When the heat went out, the temperature was -20.     Today on December 14th the heat is still out,

    Angarsk had a recent heat wave, so the highs are in the teens and low 20s, while trending colder at the end of the week.  That said, if the temperature remains below zero for a week straight, that city’s residents are living in an icebox.

    This news jogged my memory about another fact I read recently, that all of the Ukrainian attacks on the refineries have prevented the refineries from planned outages to transition to winter fuel, fuel that contains the necessary ingredient to prevent fuel freezing and gelling or doing whatever it is fuel does without those ingredients. 

    If that inability to refine winterized gas is true and continues into the December and January winter months, what effect will that have on transportation in the country?  IOW, what can you tell my ignorant self about the absence of winterized refined fuel in a country so cold - and the consequences to the countries’s economy and the military operation in Ukraine?

     

    These are two similar, but unrelated issues; A power plant going down, and refinery operations.

    There was accident at the Angarsk Irkutsk-9 Combine Heat Power Plant, a 540 MW coal fired facility that provides power and heat to both the city (250,000+) and the Rosneft-Angarsk Refinery (200,000 BPD) co-located at the sight. Angarsk is 3,000 miles from Moscow, and ~ 150 miles north of the central Mongolia, in the middle of nowhere, and I mean nowhere. 

    The Power Plant has 6 units, (capacity of 330 MW), that were built from 1963-69, and 2 units (capacity 210 MW) that were built in the early '80's. It is possible new natural gas fired boilers were added in the last 5 years, but nothing shows any newer additions.

    An accident occurred on December 7 when a boiler unit at the plant failed, and another boiler was reportedly shut down due to a malfunction a day earlier. Boiler accidents in the US are rare. In Russia, ??? depending on 60-70 year old boilers is not a comforting feeling.

    "It was reported that all services are on high alert. The emergency regime has been introduced in the Angarsk district in connection with the accident at CHPP-9. Heat supply is limited in 1,546 apartment buildings housing more than 167,000 people and 121 socially significant facilities," the local mayor's office said in a statement."

    "On Dec. 1, hundreds of motorists were stranded on a stretch of the Baikal Highway, part of the Trans-Siberian Highway, after three days of severe weather brought temperatures near minus 30 degrees Celsius (minus 22 Fahrenheit), heavy snowfall and strong winds. At its peak, the jam stretched roughly 100 kilometers (62 miles) along the southwestern shore of Lake Baikal (~ 50 miles from Angarsk). Some drivers, including families with children, reported running low on fuel, water and food."

    The logistics chain is always critical, and in remote areas, with minimal infrastructure, during extreme weather conditions, good luck with that. I would think any available power is moving towards the west (Moscow), not the east (Siberia). After 3 years of war and reduced energy availability, there are probably many localized areas that are one event away from a similar situation. One thing they have in their favor, they come from heartier stock than the average Austinite person.

    The refinery operations is something different.

    Refinery turnarounds (long term scheduled maintenance, including shut downs, every 4-6 years) are necessary, but often postponed or delayed for any number of reasons, a war being one of them.  It is not necessary to shut down the refinery to change the qualities of the products produced. US refineries do it twice a year to transition from the winter blends to the summer blends for gasoline and other transportation fuels.

    I am not familiar with the different fuel blends for the northern climates. 3 years of attacks on Russian refineries and gas plants, has probably reduced the availability of some of the blending stocks (lighter weight, more volatile) Russia may use in gasoline blending. I know alcohol is an option, but that consumption is prioritized in other areas.

    Generally, aviation fuel (Kerosine) is a cleaner, filtered diesel that is better in extreme cold. But Diesel has better lubrication properties, so it is better for engines with more moving parts, like car engines v. jet turbines.  

    I would expect the quality control on Russian refined products is poor, especially so for the domestic market. But I'm sure the average Russian has been though similar circumstances before and the black market is able to meet the demand. 

  14. 2 hours ago, Tex-19 said:

    Not a direct answer but just posted this in another thread. Basically implies the blocking/scheme sucks and the RBs suck this year.

    RT @statsowar: One way to evaluate run games in college ...

    That is a sad graphic.

    Texas is ~ 25th percentile in "Yards before contact" and ~ 27th percentile in "Yards after contact". Over all, Texas is one of the 10 worst non-QB rushing teams in the country.

    Only 3 SEC teams in the top quartile of either speaks well of SEC defenses, I think. 

    Both UTSA & Texas State punching above their weight. 

  15. 32 minutes ago, Vertuzzi said:

    Would you say that Europe’s plan to phase out Russian LNG by 2027 is still obtainable? Imports from the US and Qatar are increasing, just wondering if it would be enough to completely offset the Russian pipeline. 

    That is a complex question. "Phasing out" is a price sensitive term, and human nature generally means anybody will do anything for the right price. Putting the LNG "sanctions" aside, at the end of the day, a spot cargo of Russian LNG will be cheaper than others, simply because the transit time from Russia is less than the US Gulf Coast, or the Middle East, or Australia.

    The capacity of the two Nordsteam Pipelines was ~ 10 BCF/day, which is ~ 4-5 world class LNG Plants. That is a big hole to fill. Russia's total LNG capacity is ~ 5 BCD, some of which was earmarked for Europe.

    Some of these came on line recently, in the Arctic and St. Petersburg, and how much they can actually produce is kind of a mystery.  It is new enough, and given the challenges of the arctic, and Russia business in general, demonstrating reliability is a prerequisite for longer term contracts. In many cases, the companies/countries that need the LNG are also owners in the liquefaction/export facilities, so they take their ownership share of the LNG in-kind, rather than depending on third party sells.

    LNG is a very different animal than oil or refined products. In some cases, though there is a point to point "contract" for the LNG, that contract is in limbo until the ship docks at the destination. In times past, it was commonplace to have a ship change direction in transit and go to another destination, without any significant contract repercussions. While on the high seas, it is fair game for the highest bidder.  Even within the local gas market, that information is closely guarded, because a huge influx of gas moves the market.

    US LNG costs will become more expensive, because the underlying demand for natural gas will increase. 

    In the early 2000's, gas was expensive, so the US started building LNG import terminals.   

    image.png.8e504a2300bd0d2b7d673b7cfda795b0.png

    The Chenier Plant at Sabine Pass started as an import terminal in 2008. We received LNG imports into Louisiana ~ 2010 (I think we received 4 cargo's), and in 2012, Chenier received a FERC permit to building export facilities. The combination of horizontal  drilling and hydraulic fracturing of shale, unlocked the gas resources, and all bets changed. 

    Biden's election in 2020 changed the narrative, and Russia's Invasion and Nordstream's explosion spiked gas prices, for a bit.

    The Donald, and new reality of the US stepping in to fill the European void from losing Russian gas is not an issue from a resource/capacity perspective. The price of the LNG is the first big question.

    Domestic gas prices have doubled in the past few months. Cheap oil stops the drilling in the Permian, which is primarily based on oil economics. Appalachia is all gas, much higher near term gas potential than the Permian, but moving gas south to the Gulf Coast is limited by pipeline capacity. 

    Sending US LNG gas to Europe while increasing domestic gas prices is going to leave a mark. The Eastern US is already seeing increased gas bills because of administrative and infrastructure costs. Layering in higher commodity prices will not be well received.

    And, as we all appreciate, the whims of a new administration in DC, is hard to predict.

  16. 1 hour ago, Vertuzzi said:

    https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/germany-russia-war-nato-secret-plan-8ce43a8d?st=gZjMt3&reflink=article_copyURL_share
     

    Interesting article from the journal last week. The section regarding the bridge closing in northwestern Germany, which cut off the only railway link serving the North Sea port of Nordenham, really drives home just how critical infrastructure protection is during war. 

    Critical infrastructure is not designed to be war proof.  A single drone with a grenade is a scary thought.

    Yes, I understand and support Ukraines targeting of Russian O&G export infrastructure to cripple the war machine.

    But longer term, removing 10% of the world oil production, and the closest source of natural gas to Europe, is going to have longer term effects, on everyone. The coupling of war reparations and lifting of sanctions is going to be a thorny issue that will take time.

  17. ·

    Edited by PTINS
    typo

    20 hours ago, Schulz2.0 said:

    "Overnight on 4–5 December, Ukrainian long-range drones reportedly struck the gas terminal at Russia’s Temryuk port on the Sea of Azov, just across the Kerch Strait from occupied Crimea. Russian regional authorities themselves confirmed a UAV attack and subsequent fire that damaged port infrastructure, while videos from the scene show large fuel fires and secondary detonations. Open-source analysis indicates the blaze centered on a gas terminal used for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), with OSINT accounts suggesting that a nearby Gazprom-linked oil terminal may also have been within the target area. Temryuk is a key logistics hub handling LPG, oil products, and petrochemicals—commodities that help fuel Russia’s war machine and sustain its occupation of Ukrainian territory."

    The Temryuk NGL Terminal is ~ 50 miles from the Kerch Strait, on the Sea of Asov.

    image.png.df1d9d16479c147e6861b233e1ee982e.png

    Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) is a commercial term, either the purity Natural Gas Liquid (NGL) products, or some combination of them. The terminal receives NGL's via rail, has ~ 100,000 bbl (4.5 MM gallons) of NGL storage on site, and loads the LPG tankers. More evidence of Ukraine's approach to systematically "degrade" the Russian Oil & Gas Infrastructure.

    Good for them in choosing a location that is relatively remote, though it has a smallish footprint.  The orientation of the storage tanks, or bullets, are pointed towards each other, rather than away. Not the ideal orientation, but changing that would point the tanks at the rail rack and tanker loading/unloading berth.  Either way, it's a juicy target. 

    image.thumb.png.05e98f06dfda7317df1957944376c7ca.png

     

     

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