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synoptic

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Posts posted by synoptic

  1. 9 minutes ago, XYZ said:

    It seems that this MAD theory goes out the window if the leader of one superpower goes fucking insane.

    Indeed.

     

    4 minutes ago, SL Xpress said:

    It's an 80 year old technology that becomes easier to replicate the farther away we get from its invention. There are currently 9 nuclear powers (one undeclared). Depending on how long the human race lasts, the chances of a nuclear weapon being used once again approaches 100% with the passage of time. For that not to happen there needs to be a different, more aggressive instrument of enforcement to make sure no one can have possession of them. A no tolerance rule, with severe consequences for anyone who breaks it. That will only happen once they are actually used and we experience the devastating consequences it causes.

    I agree on the aggressive enforcement (though not necessarily via more powerful weapons), disagree on the approaching 100% nor needing nuclear weapon usage for these things to occur.      

  2. 14 minutes ago, SL Xpress said:

    A nuclear weapon is going to be used again at some point. 100% chance. At that point there might be some change in approach, but until then everyone will try to muddle through. It's not ideal, but that's how humanity works. 

    In any case, I wasn't addressing the utility of MAD or how well it works or doesn't work in the current environment. I was merely trying to address why developing ABMs has been politically challenging.

    Agreed, the treaties made sense at the time they were negotiated and signed.  I'm a bit more optimist on the chance of nukes being used again.  I think there is plausible path to them not being used again.   

  3. 27 minutes ago, SL Xpress said:

    That's exactly it.

    Think about it this way. The policy of Mutually Assured Destruction in theory protects both sides (so far in fact) because the thought is neither country will attack the other because neither one will want to end the planet. The massive buildup beyond what was necessary to actually destroy planet Earth was done because of the fear of a first strike. If either side felt like they could possibly eliminate their opponent's nuclear capability, they might be tempted to launch. So both sides made sure they had enough capability to detect and survive a first strike long enough to send a retaliatory strike. More importantly, both sides wanted to make sure they conveyed to the other they had such a capability. 

    The problem with any kind of robust anti ballistic missile system is that it immediately shifts the balance in favor of the country that develops it. The idea behind the treaties limiting its development - and also what keeps each country from pouring resources into it - is that neither side wants to destabilize MAD to the point one country would go ahead and launch before a robust ABM system could be deployed, in fear if they didn't, they would be subject to a one sided nuclear attack from the country that could employ an effective ABM system.

    There's a lot of scariness involved in Mutually Assured Destruction. The helpless feeling it engenders is purposeful. The helpless feeling is intended to make sure neither side actually contemplates using them. It's also kept Russia and the US from engaging each other in direct warfare, which to me has been a good thing.

    MAD did keep the US and Russia from direct conflict and was a policy the helped sustain relative global peace for decades after WW2.  However, it works given certain criteria, one being that both decision makers have roughly equal to lose.  An autocrat losing his mind and fearing his impeding ousting doesn't have roughly equal to lose to with western civilization.  As it stands now, we can basically be held held hostage or at lead held at bay by decaying states with effectively single person decisions makers.   I don't think MAD works for the changing modern world.       

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  4. 10 minutes ago, FartingMonk said:

    The rotation is more like 3 and 3.  3 east coast subs.  3 west coast subs.  2 on standby rotation and 4 in some sort of long term maintenance.  24 ICBMs but it's more like 200 per submarine with the MIRVS.  The actual number I don't even know even though right outside our bunk room is a nuclear missile tube. 

    As far as why we can't shoot the missiles down is because of ABM, SALT, and START treaties. We aren't allowed to shoot them out of orbit when it goes into space.  It was a MAD thing.  Although we have gotten further and further away from it.  The Chinese have shot satellites out of the sky.  So have the Russians.  We do too so while we can do it.  It's sort of illega

     

     

    Yep, also the treaties.  Technical and political challenges.

     

    6 minutes ago, Paper_jam said:

    I thought we de-MIRVed our inventory, but maybe this is out of date now:

    https://allthingsnuclear.org/emacdonald/the-end-of-mirvs-for-u-s-icbms/

     

    The Minutemen III ICBMs were de-MIRVed.  Trident SLBMs are still MIRV. 

  5. 1 minute ago, UTGrad98 said:

    So why can't we stop the missiles? Seems like that would be the number 1 goal and yet everything I read is, nope once Russia hits the button we are all fucked. What have we been doing for the last 50 years? 

    It's incredibly difficult to intercept intercontinental type ballistic missiles.  They travel at very high speeds and high altitudes, and then most modern types separate into multiple entry vehicles for each warhead (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle  - MIRV).  We've spent billions of dollars to date, but our current best systems will probably catch none.  Certainly not enough to make any real difference in terms of altering MAD. 

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  6. Didn't want to create large side discussion on the Ukrainian war thread, so starting thread on the subject topic that often comes up.  Here is a table I put together looking at the operational Russian ballistic missile fleet that has capability to strike the US:

    Missile Name Class Basing Began Operation Range (miles) Number of missiles
    in operation
    Number of warheads
    per missile
    Warhead Delivery Accuracy (CEP) Yield per warhead Projected number of deliverable warheads Deliverable yield
    R-29R Vysota (NATO: SS-N-18) Stingray SLBM Submarine 1977 4,000 32 3 MIRV 900 m 50 kT 96 48 MT
    R-29RM Shtil (NATO: SS-N-23) Sineva SLBM Submarine 1986 5,150 96 4 MIRV 500 m 100 kT 320 32 MT
    RSM-56 (NATO: SS-N-32) Bulava SLBM Submarine 2013 5,150 80 10 MIRV 250 m 100 - 160 kT 320 51.2 MT
    R-36 (NATO: SS-18 ) Mod 6 Satan ICBM Silo based 1988 6,800 46 10 MIRV 500 m 500 - 750 kT 460 345 MT
    UR-100NUTTH (SS-19 Mod 3) Stiletto ICBM Silo based 1980 6,200 20 6 MIRV 900 m 400 - 500 kT 120 60 MT
    Topol (SS-25) Sickle ICBM Road mobile 1988 6,800 150 1 Single warhead 900 m 550 - 800 kT 72 120 MT
    Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1) Sickle B ICBM Road mobile and silo based 1997 6,800 80 1 Single warhead 200 m 550 kT 78 44 MT
    RS-24 Yars (NATO: SS-27 Mod 2)  Yars ICBM Road mobile and silo based 2010 6,500 73 3 MIRV 150 m 150 - 200 kT 219 43.8 MT

     

    Here is the operational US ballistic missile fleet that has capability to strike Russia:

    Missile Name Class Basing Began Operation Range (miles) Number of missiles
    in operation
    Number of warheads
    per missile
    Warhead Delivery Accuracy (CEP) Yield per warhead Projected number of deliverable warheads Deliverable yield
    UGM-133 Trident II D5  Trident SLBM Submarine 1990 7,450 240 12, (8 under START) MIRV 90 m 100 - 475 kT 1920 912 MT
    LGM-30G Minuteman III  Minuteman III  ICBM Silo based 1970 8,050 440 1 (3 with MIRV) Single warhead (MIRV Capable) 120 m 300 - 475 kT 440 176 MT

     

    Note on the numbers: you can find various sources that provide a different values.  Some we don’t know with certainty (such as exact yield and number in operation) and so estimates are given.   Russia doesn’t always publish specifics, and what they do publish is of course not always completely true.  These numbers are from the more reliable sources I can find:
    https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/

    https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1462912
     

    Few things that stand out:  
    •    The US has standardized on ballistic missiles, while Russia still has many types in service.
    •    US missiles are more accurate.
    •    The idea of using max payload warheads was jettisoned long ago in favor of greater number of smaller but more accurate warheads under 1 MT.
    •    Russian is moving towards mobile as opposed to silo based for ICBM, while US only employs silo based ICBMs.
    •    US has put more capability in SLBM and had much more firepower in terms of number of deployable warheads and yield per warhead in the SLBM fleet.
    •    Charts that simply show total number of nuclear warheads/bombs are useless.  
    •    Either side has enough yield to effectively end the other even if just small fraction of their arsenal lands.

    Some things not shown on the charts:
    •    The US ballistic missile fleet is far better maintained and more routinely tested than the Russian arsenal.  It’s expensive to maintain and test fire missiles.  
    •    Russian chart is a bit misleading, because even though they may have the missiles as shown, they are not always deployable on demand.  For example, they have 11 nuclear missile subs, but at a given time probably only 3 or 4 are underway.   This means their total deployable SLBM arsenal is closer to 48 at any given time.  But for the US, we have 14 Ohio class subs with 12 underway at any given time.  Each Ohio class sub can hold up to 20 tridents, so our deployable fleet of SLBMs at any given time is probably close to 200.
    •    This chart neglects aircraft delivered nuclear weapons.  I’m skeptical Russia can get any planes in our air space at this point.  
    •    I didn’t even consider NATO nuclear weapons.  UK and France have capable ballistic missiles as well.

    Ultimately, we have a better arsenal with fewer targets to hit, and they have not as good of an arsenal with more targets to hit.  But their arsenal is still good enough to change civilization as we know it.  Think how much 9/11 changed society with just crashing airplanes and 3,000 dead in a single city.  Now imagine a few hundred nuclear warheads hitting detonating across many major US cities and tens of millions dead.   I’m not sure either side “wins” a nuclear war, but there is no way Russia wins and they know this.  
     

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  7. 27 minutes ago, Bevo said:

    I posted about this probably 100 pages ago. According to posters, we clearly killed Russian pilots in Vietnam and Korea. And that did not lead to war between us and Russia. So, it is not beyond the realm of possibility to allow mercenaries to fly planes sold or donated to the Ukranian government.

    Those are decades old examples of USSR interfering in our wars.  This would be us interfering in a Russian war with a bordering country in what they view as a type of reunification/civil war.  

    In any case, it can be argued exactly where the line is in terms of weapons lending tolerance, but there is definitely a line.  Massively tipping the balance of the war with our superior aircraft very likely crosses that line.  And even if we determine that it is worth the risk and we want to go that route, then we might as well use properly trained american pilots because Russians will neither know nor care who the pilots are.  If they start getting lit up by F-22s, us sending them a note saying "don't worry, those are not American pilots" won't do any good.  

  8. There is a limit to what is tolerated in terms of weapons lending in modern proxy wars.  For example, suppose we lent Ukraine a single ICBM with nuclear warheads.  Russia would know it came from us and would not care if it were the Ukrainians that entered the launch codes.  We would be in a nuclear war.  Likewise, if US and NATO aircraft start shooting down Russian aircraft and taking out their convoys with F-22s and F-35s, the nationality of the pilots simply won't matter.  We would be directly in the war as far as Russia is concerned.  They wouldn't be pondering the technicalities and perplexed by loopholes with this type of weaponry involved.    

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  9. It’s interesting how quick American public sentiment can move from pacifist to hawk.  Every military campaign this century had mixed public support at best and there has been growing support for reducing the massive US defense budget.   But there is now fairly strong support for a military campaign against the only country with a nuclear arsenal somewhat comparable to our own on behalf of a country that has never been an ally.

    My view for some time has been that the ballistic missile stockpile of Russia (and China and NK to a lesser degree) is the only thing that prevents complete western hegemony and creates balance with the autocratic states.  Russia understands this very well, which is why the Bulava SLBM was their most expensive weapon program.  Why would a nation in desperate need of upgrades in their conventional army spend so much on an SLBM?  The answer is because they know they cannot catch us with their conventional army, but their ballistic missile arsenal will always make them a global player with weight to throw around.  

    The gap between the conventional armies of the US+allies and Russia (and also China) is miles apart.  The PR war with western democracies and the authoritarian states is also not close.  But the world will have to tolerate insane autocrats such as Putin as long as the potential for a ballistic missile attack remains.  Even if Putin dies tomorrow, what’s to stop another from rising again?  

    World needs a solution for this problem.  There is zero chance Russia voluntarily lets go of these weapons, so there is no easy diplomatic solution in the foreseeable future.   I’m an advocate for advanced intercept defense systems; let’s figure out a way to block them and/or make Russia spend money they don’t have to update their missiles and break them in the process.  Some argue this is outdated cold war thinking.  But here we are.   
     

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  10. 59 minutes ago, Bama Chick said:


    From that thread - from an interview with Viktor Surorov. He's a former Soviet GRU officer.

    2e2545ea27df5af067a215bb6b044563.jpg
    giphy.gif

     

    Not sure about the last three responses, but the first is definitely false.  The west is concerned with Russia’s nuclear arsenal and it is the primary consideration in our participation in the conflict.   Arguably their most concerning missiles are their submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).  Russia has 11 ballistic missile submarines, and their modern subs can hold 16 Bulava SLBMs.  A single Bulava can hold 6 to 10 warheads.  The Bulava is a modern missile designed in this century and successfully tested and deployed just a few years ago.  They are manufactured in Votkinsk, Russia.  We have no intercept system that can stop it.  So a single Russian sub can hit the US with as many as 160 nuclear warheads.       

     

     

     

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  11. 4 minutes ago, ChiTownDoc said:

    Yes, I definitely said it's not that simple - BUT it's quite a bit more complicated then I gave it credit for.  I still hold out hope.  Donated MIGs and Ukrainian pilots give me hope.  And through all the BS I did learn that Ukrainian pilots can actually fly nonRussian MIGs so I'll continue to hold out us targeting that god damned convoy.  

    Fair enough.  By the way, I got a Polish friend to type this for me.  Took me awhile to train him on my Latin alphabet keyboard, but if you have any issue with this exchange, then you need to take it up with him 😉   

  12. 10 minutes ago, ChiTownDoc said:

    They already got to the point where they are giving jets.  And yes, Ukrainian pilots should be able to fly some of them.  Better than nothing.  We aren't gonna see Maverick and Goose but I'll take any MIGs targeting that convoy.  

    Perhaps the most eye-popping of today’s pledges to ship weapons to the Ukrainian military was the European Union’s announcement that it would soon send fighter jets.

    Your earlier quote was "Let's scramble some of our best jets and slap a Ukrainian flag on whatever pilot volunteers to do God's work.  I know it's not that simple - but it's also not that much more complicated."  We do that and we are now in the war.  The nationality of the pilot wouldn't be the main point of contention for Russia.  They probably wouldn't even bother checking his passport.     

  13. 31 minutes ago, ChiTownDoc said:

    I mean I do know a little, a lot by no means.  But is someone here more experienced?  Love to hear from them.  If you don't think there's very capable fighter jets that can be flown by euro pilots then I think you're wrong.  That's my lightly educated guess.  

    Knowledge of jets and who can fly what has got nothing to do with it.  Any US to EU pilot/jet combo would be the same diplomatic problem.  A German flying an F-22 to attack the Russian convoy will piss them of just as much as an America piloting the F-22.  They may be perplexed for a moment why we bother with the German pilot if they found out we did such a bizarre tactic, but their reaction would be the same.     

  14. 1 hour ago, BabaYaga said:

    No bueno.  

    These thermobaric weapons are the second most powerful option next to nukes.  

    No NUKES on UKES!

     

     

    1 hour ago, Ghost of LL said:

    To forestall the impact that this is going to have on Russian society, Putin needs to win this war in the next month and convince the West to rescind all sanctions.  And that's just not going to happen.

    These two posts are why I believe Russia will move into protracted occupation with escalating artillery and shelling with the intent to get favorable cease fire agreement with lifted sanctions.  Putin wants control of a mostly intact Ukraine.  Since that it not an option due to Ukraine's fierce resistance, his best course of action is to get out while showing as much strength as possible and getting sanctions lifted.  So parade around some impressive artillery and launch a few thermobaric bombs to grab attention and use as leverage to let the world know they can and will level Ukraine if they choose to do so.  Negotiate from there.

    Regardless of recent displays of ineptitude, Russia does have essentially unblockable ballistic missiles and heavy artillery that can level Ukraine.  Of course a leveled Ukraine is not much value to Russia and even worse means they will be permanently sanctioned/isolated from the west.  Putin only goes this route if he wants Ukraine dead or alive at any and all costs.  If that is the case then Ukraine is going to get leveled.  But I don't think he's there yet, otherwise there would be more than the few isolated thermobaric bombs, and I think there will be enough sane people in Russian leadership that don't want to become glorified North Korea.         

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  15. Agreed with those saying not to escalate.  Russians tried to drop in and take over, believing they would get support from the locals and that Ukrainian leadership would flee (similar to Georgia and Crimea).  They were wrong.  But they made a cultural/mindset miscalculation of the Ukrainian people, not strictly a military one.  If they want to level the Ukraine they absolutely have the ability to do so even without resorting to nuclear weapons.  Now they are painted into a corner  - if they simply retreat, they look weak and have no leverage over removal of sanctions, and if they level Ukraine with conventional weapons, the world and even their own people turn on them (and also what is the value in a completely razed Ukraine).  My guess is they will go for some middle ground with protracted occupation and try to negotiate cease fire with lifted sanctions.   


    But what we absolutely should not do is fly US aircraft over Ukraine and trigger all out Russian attack in the Ukraine and maybe elsewhere.     

      

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  16. 6 minutes ago, shadow_operative said:

    i lnever watch the news, i don't have a facebook, i use reddit follow my soccer team, and i post pretty photos on instagram once or twice a month. that's the extent of my media, be it news or social. there's some iteration of your post on every page of this thread, and you guys all say it with so much confidence, as it's the most factually correct thing that's ever been said, when in reality it's nothing more than your own less-than-stellar opinion. i'm the guy who's asking the question, and yet you're telling me that i'm only asking it because the media has scared me into doing so, and that everything is fine. wrong. shit is tenuous, at best, right now, for a lot of people, and there's a category 5 shit storm brewing on the horizon, and it's gonna be there whether the news talks about it or not. the only question is if/when it will touch land. convincing yourself that the storm doesn't exist doesn't do anybody any good.

     

    There is some version of your post on virtually every social media outlet - society is not sustainable, the disintegration of everything we hold dear, predicting or suggesting the crumbling of the republic.  Storms a ‘brewing and bad shit on the horizons.   What virtually all these claims have in common is that none of them are verifiable or falsifiable.   It is even worse than the end of the world zealots, because at least they occasionally will make a falsifiable claim (e.g. the world will cease to exist on March 15, 2019).  We don’t even get that courtesy with the end of the republic zealots.  They make no concrete claims nor give any timelines.  Just general feelings about how we are in for some unprecedented bad shit.

       
    How do you define “crumbled”?   Do you think there will be a civil war?  Will some states secede?  Will martial law be declared?  If so, when do you think any of this will happen?  Make some concrete claim and we can discuss.  All of these discussions are predicated on nebulous claims and vague predications that merely express general concern about the direction the nation is heading.  Even in this thread, a poster above claimed that the nation will probably continue on, but in some abstract notion the nation is already gone.  It is not even meaningful to refute these claims because they say nothing concrete.    

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  17. So the nation can recover from an actual civil war, but not a potential civil war.  

    The reason that this topic can't help but turn political is because the widespread messaging suggesting the looming end of our republic comes from fear based political propaganda designed to turn out the vote.  That is why the two ideas are intimately linked when this topic comes up.  The fate of the very existence of our nation hangs on the result of this next election, so don't sit at home and let human civilization crumble.  They pump this bullshit so much that it has been ingrained in people’s minds and now the idea can't simply be switched off.  Now every news story and every negative aspect of modern society is interpreted as a sign of the inevitable collapse, and if you don’t see it it’s because your eyes haven’t been opened to the truth.  No amount of real data about the progress of civilization will convince the doom and gloom zealots that the nation is not actually going to hell in a handbasket.  

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  18. On 11/13/2021 at 7:06 AM, Dahobbs said:

    I'm asking for a specific example of person at a company (e.g., a job title) or some governmental agency that actually uses that metric. I think it is an interesting metric. I don't think it is seriously used by governments or industry to evaluate resource development beyond perhaps confirming that a particular energy source has a EROI exceeding 1. 

    I meant a negative return of energy or a EROI less than 1. Sorry for the confusion. I readily admit to being an amateur on this topic. But I don't find the distinction between hydrogen as a energy source vs carrier to be anything but arbitrary. Hydrogen is readily available, just not on earth. If we had a hydrogen mine, it surely would be an energy source. And we could expend resources to extract from extraterrestrial sources and it would then be considered an energy source (just one with a very low EROI). Further, if the process of extracting Hydrogen from water required less energy, I'm sure it would be considered an energy source as opposed to a mere carrier. The distinction between hydrogen in this context and corn ethanol or various bio fuels (which are often analyzed in terms of EROI in the literature) seems to be non-existent. Hydrogen is available from water to the same extent ethanol is available from corn. The primary difference is that it takes more energy to separate hydrogen from water than the hydrogen produces. Of course, arguably, the same is actually true for corn ethanol once it is actually ready to be used as a fuel.

    Finally, EROI does appear to be used in the literature to analyze both primary sources and carriers. e.g, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-019-0327-0?proof=t

    Citation? Germany, like many places is just starting to add storage. The increase in storage was not required for their renewable transition to this point. I'm not aware of any evidence that absent the modest amounts of storage that exist, Germany's current grid would be unworkable. Further, your focus on Germany is odd given that I provided numerous examples of grids that have well in excess of 30% of their electric needs generated by renewables. 

    https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/8/9/20767886/renewable-energy-storage-cost-electricity

    https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322911171_How_much_electrical_energy_storage_do_we_need_A_synthesis_for_the_US_Europe_and_Germany

    I never said it was. We just appear to disagree what a "large percent means." You've apparently taken the position that anything over 20% is a large percent and requires dramatic increases in storage. This just isn't true and I don't see any support for this claim in the literature. At very high percentages of electric generation, in excess of 80%, storage does become more important and is probably the most economic way for us to reach 100% renewables. But, there is no real reason why the grid needs to be 100%  variable renewables. There have been quite a few papers on what requirements would be necessary to reach close to 100% renewables for electric generation.  Again, prominent in the discussion is that overbuilding capacity reduces storage requirements. The mix just depends on the economics of additional storage vs the economics of additional capacity. It'll also greatly depends on the type of renewable used in the grid, with solar requiring more storage than wind. 

    Yes it is. The figures I provided were actual generation, not nameplate power. 

    On EROEI, it's used in analysis for longer term energy planning by governments, investors, technology developers, etc.  Again, it's one of many tools and metrics; but it is a very important one.  If a group has done their work and determined that the EROEI is sufficiently low, they may decide to pursue or invest in that energy source.  The video in the original linked post on the topic was an overview on why that group is no investing in renewables (they believe the EROEI is too low to be a long term viable technology).  Again, that is subject to dispute and debate, but groups do put a lot of effort into trying to calculate these numbers and they do make decisions based on it.

    Germany added lots of storage capacity over last several years and this was critically important to enabling them to increase their percentage of energy consumed from renewables.  By end of 2020, they were close to 3,000 MWh in storage capacity - more than 10 fold increase from 2015.  The energy storage market in Germany grew from less than $100M in to 2015 to now over $1 billion annually.     

     

    Germany: Growth in home and industrial sectors but large-scale battery  storage slowed down in 2019 - Energy Storage News

    https://www.energy-storage.news/germany-growth-in-home-and-industrial-sectors-but-large-scale-battery-storage-slowed-down-in-2019/

    In the first quarter of 2020, strong winds and a high share of sunshine hours had resulted in a record renewables share. This year’s preliminary data "show us how important it is to develop high-performance storage technologies in order to be able to compensate for phases with unfavourable weather conditions," said BDEW managing director Kerstin Andreae.

    https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/renewables-cover-40-german-power-consumption-first-quarter-2021

    As was stated, storage is crirtical to achieve high percentage of energy consumption from renewables.  

     

     

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  19. 9 minutes ago, Dahobbs said:

    You keep saying that. Who uses it? And to do what? Give me a concrete example because as far as I can tell it isn't actually used by anybody that actually decides what to build or develop. It seems that whatever importance it has is better captured in other metrics. 

    How do you arrive at your conclusion? Most studies I've seen suggest that renewables can make up to 60%-80% of electrical power generation fairly easily. After that, it becomes significantly more expensive for each point of increase. Hell, in the US renewables account for ~20% of generation already (and California itself is above 50%). Germany is above 50%. Iceland and Norway are essentially 100% renewable.  Brazil is at 80%. The UK is above 40%. 

    If power generation is entirely local or even regional, then yes, additional capacity may not help if all of it is subject to the same variations. But, diversifying the locations of power generation should alleviate that problem so long as the power can be exported to areas in need.  I've seen Germany's experience cited by other posters as a reason that renewable grid isn't feasible. However, that analysis is always shallow and fails to account for other factors that contributed to Germany's temporary problem and the makeup of its current grid, which is both reliable and made up of a significantly higher percentage of renewable generation. Germany's issue wasn't/isn't lack of storage, it was lack of generation as nuclear plants went offline, forcing a greater percentage on fossil fuels temporarily while renewables were built, and issues with transmission preventing power from the renewable heavy north to reach the south. 

    https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/set-and-challenges-germanys-power-grid

    "Germany’s power grid ranks among the most reliable in the world despite the rapid expansion of renewables. Its System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), which measures the average yearly downtime per customer, amounted to 12 minutes in 2019, a slight decrease from almost 14 minutes in 2018, according to the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA). Compared to 128 minutes in the US (2016), 53 minutes in Great Britain, 92 minutes in Greece, 54 minutes in Spain, 41 in Italy, 50 in France and 192 in Poland (2014 data). When looking at the interruptions including exceptional events, the difference gets even bigger with Germany's consumers spending an average 12 minutes withouth power, compared to  92.5 minutes in Great Britain, 122 minutes in Greece, 52 minutes in Spain, 93 in Italy, 51 in France, 205 in Poland (2014 data) and 314 minutes in the US (2016)."

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electricity_sector_in_Germany

    "Germany's electrical grid is part of the Synchronous grid of Continental Europe. In 2020, Germany produced 484 TWh of electricity of which 50% was from renewable energy sources, 24% from coal, and 12% from natural gas.[2] This is the first year renewables represented more than 50% of the total electricity production and a major change from 2018, when a full 38% was from coal, only 40% was from renewable energy sources, and 8% was from natural gas.[5]

    Germany's installed capacity for electric generation increased from 121 gigawatts (GW) in 2000 to 218 GW in 2019, an 80% increase, while electricity generation increased only 5% in the same period.[6]"

    That's simply not true. France is the frankly the exception as far as I know. None of the countries I listed above get a larger percentage of their electrical generation from nuclear than the US. But maybe you can provide different examples. 

     

    EROEI is used in the way I mentioned (evaluating long term potential return on energy sources).  You don’t use to decide wether to develop or invest in a given project. I think you are just learning about the concept and not quite familiar with it, based on some of your comments. For example, you applied it to hydrogen above in your example of “negative EROI” (presumably you just meant less than one?).  But hydrogen is not an energy source; it is an energy carrier and storage medium.  So no, there aren’t any useful energy sources with EROI less than one.  That is crazy.  Negative is even crazier.  Also, I think you are factoring in the fuel itself energy into in the denominator.  But I’m not certain exactly what what you doing because frankly the claims don’t make any sense.  
     

    Germany was able to hit around 50% consumed energy in part because they added lots of storage capacity (also mild winter and covid impact on energy helped).  California has also added storage capacity.  It’s well known in the energy industry that renewables has to be accompanied with storage to achieve large percent of energy consumed.  This is not a controversial claim.  Also, It’s important to distinguish between power generation capacity in MW and actual energy consumed in MWH.  It’s easier to get high percentage of total power gen by name plate power. 

  20. 44 minutes ago, Dahobbs said:

    I think you missed the big part of my objection. LCOE can be and is used to practical effect in developing/building new power generation. The metric being calculated wrong is a fixable problem, and one that doesn't impact the overall usefulness of LCOE as a tool in making determinations about new power generation. EROI on the other hand is an entirely academic endeavor with little in the way of practical use. It is interesting to analyze the EROI of society at various points in times and under different conditions, but the broad statement that modern society needs a certain EROI appears to me to be entirely unsupported. Rather, the EROI needed will depend greatly on the type of energy generation utilized by the society, how it is built/gathered, and where the constraint in supply exists. That constraint may be in material, in time, in workers/work hours, or in economics. All of those have different implications for the EROI required to keep a society running. Ultimately, specific factors are far more important to identifying viable energy generation than the single EROI number. Hell, even a source with a negative EROI may in fact be very useful and wanted by society. A simple example of that is the ability to convert energy from a fixed, low density source to a portable, high density format (e.g., creating hydrogen to replace fuel sources vehicles and aircraft). 

    As to energy portfolio, given current technological trends, replacing the vast majority of fossil fuel sources with renewable energy (wind, solar, geothermal, hydro) would be ideal both economically and for the climate. I think the need for energy storage with a renewable grid is usually exaggerated. While storage can definitely be useful, over building capacity and creating large interconnected grids reduces the need for a large amount of storage. And it isn't like we're unfamiliar with the concept of over building capacity. We do it right now with fossil fuel (and nuclear) plants under the assumption that a significant portion of them will be down for maintenance or other issues at any given time. Gas peaker plants probably have a continued future in our energy mix as well, at least for the next 30 years. The carbon emissions by them can be offset by carbon capture efforts elsewhere.

    I'd love nuclear to be a part of that, but it needs to be economically feasible. So far it simply isn't competitive. Regardless, I think continued development of nuclear energy (including fusion) is important because it is the only power source we currently have that can allow us to truly be an interstellar species.

    On the metrics, they are used to measure different things and both have their uses.  When evaluating what type of energy portfolio a society should pursue and develop, EROEI is definitely an important criteria to consider.  
     

    On storage, it is not exaggerated at all.  We cannot replace base load type power plants that have high capacity factors with renewables without substantial amounts of long duration storage.  No amount of name plate power alone can practically solve for a lack of storage.  Grids will hit a certain percentage on MWH supplied by renewables (usually around 15-20%) and then start to plateau even with the addition of more nameplate renewable power.  Lots of wind was added in Germany several years back and fossil fuel production capacity was scaled back, but not enough storage was added.  The result was the percentage of total energy from wind hit the normal plateau, and then coal consumption increased to compensate.  Bottom line is we aren’t getting away from coal, NG, and nuclear and moving to renewables without massive amounts of long duration energy storage capabilities. 
     

    Also, the developed nations that have the lowest carbon emissions per MWH consumed (i.e. carbon intensity) all have higher percentage of nuclear energy production.  France, for example. 

     

  21. 15 minutes ago, Dahobbs said:

    I have no problem with nuclear. It hasn't been economical, but if something happens to change that, great. And I have no doubt that EROEI is a real metric with a real number. But, if we don't have the ability to calculate that number, I question whether it is truly an relevant metric for any practical purpose. Again, when is it actually used in decision making, whether at a governmental level or a industry level? Your criticisms of LCOE notwithstanding, it at least has the advantage of being something we can actually calculate and use to practical effect.

    I just don't see the practical, non-academic use of EROEI. And, having read a bit of the academic pieces, I'm really not sure I understand the basis for saying society needs a number north of 7 (or other numbers that vary based on the study). That, to me, seems highly dependent on how that energy is acquired and how it is used. If it takes 50% of the population working in the energy sector to keep society running, then yes, you're going to have problems having a modern, diverse society. But if, instead of time, the primary energy investment is existing amply electrical energy (e.g., from solar, wind, nuclear), then what does it matter so long as the ratio is energy positive? 

    The article below seemed to be a very thoughtful approach on the topic. 

    https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332219302209

     

    Both EROI and LCOE can be calculated.  We can also challenge the accuracy of either type of calculation.  LCOE doesn’t have any advantage over EROI in that regard; it’s probably even more subject to manipulation and error.  Generally, wind and solar groups push LCOE as it is easier to work to highlight advantages of renewables, and nuclear groups tend to push EROI as it can be used to highlight nuclear advantages.  Of course there are many other metrics to use, such as initial CapEx, CapEx per MW, maintenance and opex, TCO, TRL, scalability, geographic suitability/flexibility, required footprint per MW, capacity factor, and so on. 
     

    I think we agree that the various metrics all have value and all quantifications of these metrics are are subject scrutiny.  But if you don’t think much of EROI, then don’t use it.   Let’s talk energy type/portfolio pros and cons and preferred directions & developments.  

  22. 46 minutes ago, Dahobbs said:

    Why? It appears in academic articles, but there is appears to be some disagreement about its importance. Again, other than identifying assets that simply will not be net productive, in what context does that metric actual matter that isn't covered by other metrics such a levelized cost of energy? When would you use it and why?  

    Disagreements are based on questioning particular calculations (it’s hard to quantity total energy input); same challenge with many other indicators (such as LCOE).  But every energy source has some EROEI, whether we know that number with supreme accuracy or not, and that ratio needs to be high for it to support modern society.  We have a finite amount of energy and whatever we invest that in needs to return energy at a high multiple.  There is no way around this.  The number given varies, but the low end EROI for economic break-even for developed countries is around 7.  Below that and no amount of taxes, subsidies, or PR will be able make the energy source sustain society long term.  Higher EROEI gives us energy flexibility and surplus to grow and push societal development.  


    LCOE is also a useful metric.  Like any metric, it also doesn’t tell the whole story.  LCOE is even easier to trick, as is done often with renewables (e.g. includes subsidies, doesn’t include storage).  LCOE is perhaps the most abused metric in energy.  Again, doesn’t mean it isn’t real or is useless; just doesn’t tell everything. 


    But more importantly than validity of given metrics, presumably you have some preferred energy portfolio you think society should pursue (I’m guessing nuclear doesn’t feature prominently).  What does the dahobbs energy infrastructure of tomorrow look like?    

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