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Shady Ray

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Everything posted by Shady Ray

  1. Mariupol would be complete carnage. They have hardened their position against Moscow so much since the last go-round.
  2. And at the risk of a bit too much “inside baseball”, the political situation that the Federal Govt is looking at on the ground is so complicated for even the most secure anti-NS2 politicians. The only Party leadership in the Bundestag that has shown openness to killing NS2 are the Greens: specifically Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, and Minister of the Environment and Economy, Robert Habeck. Well, two days ago at the party conference of the Northern Greens, the rank-and-file voted to break with Baerbock and Habeck (who is also their own former state party chairman), saying that they will revolt if the leadership supports any further steps to build LNG terminals in the north, which, of course, is the only place they can be built. They said that the leadership had turned its back on Green Party principles by showing openness for the US to send LNG that came from fracking. They then overwhelmingly rejected Habeck’s motion to support the construction of one, single terminal in Schleswig-Holstein, which would be used to receive US LNG. Now, the rejection of a resolution at the conference of the loony Northern Greens is not going to bind the federal government, but it does show how complicated and politically volatile this is going to be for every party across the political spectrum.
  3. Yeah, the governing class is going to be desperate to show that it is on the right side of history here. But the big question that will be answered is whether this sentiment finally crosses the threshold between the elites/media and the rank-and-file Germans. I don't think anyone can answer that one at the moment. Al Jazeera had a great article on this a couple of weeks back, where it touched on this, which is a worthwhile read. Re this issue of disconnection between the media/politicians/elites and the German voters: However, the US’s stance has not had the desired effect in Germany, and Russia has piled on the pressure, with the state-run Tass news agency saying sanctions on the pipeline would lead to declining energy supplies and gas price growth in Europe. “The more the US talks about sanctioning or criticises the project, the more it becomes popular in German society,” said Stefan Meister, a Russia and eastern Europe expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations. “Germans in the majority support the project, it is only parts of the elite and media who are against the pipeline.” A gas supply shortage in Europe has been widely blamed on a dearth of gas flows from Russia. It has particularly hit Germany’s low-income workers, which Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) party rely on for votes. “Germany has been resisting pressure from the US because it absolutely needs reliable gas supplies from Russia and, for all it is now one of the top exporters of liquified natural gas in the world, the US cannot replace Russia in that role as key gas supplier to Germany,” said Ronald Smith, senior oil and gas analyst at BCS Global Markets. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/25/ukraine-russia-what-is-nord-steam-2-and-why-is-it-contentious One of the points that the SPD has started making lately is, "if we are unable to get Russian gas, are we now going to be expected to pay twice the price for LNG (that we aren't even able to efficiently receive) that has been sourced from equally-evil Middle Eastern autocrats merely because they are allied with the West?" When the prices spike even higher than they already have - which is significant - I expect this type of argument to start becoming much more prevalent in the public discourse. It's gonna be a political shit show, as the extremes on the extreme left, die Linke, and the extreme right, the Alternative für Deutschland, are already rabble rousing saying that killing NS2 will demonstrate peak capitulation to US interests at the expense of the German people. Now, that isn't going to result in some massive shift towards their parties, as both parties are largely seen as too extreme, but it definitely could peel off enough from the respective right/left flanks of the centrist parties to make governing Germany almost impossible. We have already seen this fracturing occur to the degree where for the first time in history Germany was unable to cobble together a two-party coalition, resulting in the current tripartide "Traffic Light Coalition" of the SPD, Greens, and Free Democrats. A shift of even 3 percent to the extremes could have a massive impact on coaltion building. In short, it's going to destablize Germany politically if NS2 dies.
  4. All bullshit aside, the top headline of the Focus this morning is: "What Happened in the Russia Crisis While You Were Sleeping". As V.I. Lenin (/ShutTheFuckUpDonny!) said, "There are decades where nothing happens, and there are weeks where decades happen." Well, after the slow plodding along of this situation, the speed of last night's events is going to induce a lottttttt of German pant-shitting this AM.
  5. European day shift checking in. Had a long day travelling yesterday and conked out at the hotel early...anything of note happen overnight? /s
  6. I have mentioned it before way upthread, but I have three direct reports in Moscow, all of whom are between 40 and 50, well-educated, well-connected, with plenty of years working abroad, including plenty of time in the West. They are the proto-typical Muscovites who are to a large degree open to western ideas and deeper European integration, and they regularly consume English-language media. And even with all that, all of them feel the exact same way as your co-worker. They definitely see Putin’s faults, and they don’t support him blindly on every issue, particularly when it comes to domestic issues. But when it comes to foreign affairs, they’ve got a real issue with NATO (and the U.S. in general), and they don’t see the Alliance as being purely defensive or innocent. 

Ultimately, we don’t have the benefit of solid public opinion barometers in Russia. Levada Center is the only one that is considered “independent” by Western standards, and Putin’s treatment of Levada by forcing it to register as a foreign agent would indicate that it truly is not under his thumb. So, with that caveat, here’s the most recent stuff from Levada: https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/02/18/approval-of-institutions-the-state-of-affairs-in-the-country-trust-in-politicians-2/ And a broader thought on his polling: When US analysts put on their “Putin-Understander” hats and say, “His support is collapsing at home, so he has to start a risky war abroad”, it is generally pretty flimsy political analysis, because it really isn’t true. Sure, his numbers move in ebbs and flows, but support has been over 60% for 20 years…and without anything even close to a threat (and nooooo, Navalny is not a threat), I don’t see him making decisions to go to war based on a fear of losing popular support. In fact, rushing into an unpopular war would be the biggest risk to dragging those numbers down, so the idea that this is a "Wag the Dog" driven move is a silly one. Increasing pensions in the provinces (which Russia is somewhat in a position to do economically at the moment) or conducting certain other domestic reforms are generally enough to buy him enough support to get back over that 65% number). Now, he certainly creates media spin to keep his base content…and he is certainly spinning things now to prepare them for war. But that is a very different thing than fearing that he will lose his claim on power due to sliding poll numbers.
  7. Deutschland absolutely wildin'. And Italy starting to move into open alignment with Germany now. Rome has always silently backed the German approach to this issue, but now they are starting to step out more openly.
  8. In case anyone is interested, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Mission to Ukraine is compiling daily reports of ceasefire violations, complete with a map and statistics, based on what their monitors are seeing. https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports The reports run a day or so behind, but it is showing where the activity is and I imagine it will be at least some type of resource to check in coming days. As resident Surly Jason Bourne aka @InkaUtexas has accurately stated before, OSCE isn't necessarily the most effective intergovernmental org. Here are the graphics of ceasefire violations and the map of incidents from the 18th.
  9. Yeah. And there wasn't much of an military operation required, as the Russians already had a significant military presence on the peninsula due to their base at Sevastopol. What they lacked, they made up by sending in the Special Forces little green men to supplement. They basically just walked in, blended in with the overwhelming Russian-speaking majority, barricaded the Crimean Parliament, barricaded the Isthmus of Perekop, and effectively cut off the peninsula from the Ukrainian mainland. They then just took over the existing Ukrainian military installations and it was done. Only a couple of people died in the whole ordeal.
  10. Sorry, included the wrong graph there. And per the VW annual report, it sold 3.8 million units to China, with 575,000 to the US. Mercedes results are similar in percentages to BMW, as is Audi's.
  11. China is the biggest market for the most important industry in Germany, Automobile Manufacturing. And the car manufacturers competely run the show here. China has become the king for them, even before Covid. But China saved German auto industry after Covid hit, so the dependency has only increased. And the biggest of them all, VW, also sold a metric fuckton into China last year...almost 4 million cars. It dwarfed any other market.
  12. Can the Bundeswehr pick this Ukrainian lady up on the way? Because she'll fully double its fighting capabilities...
  13. Is it distributing Russian propaganda if I post videos of her leggy-ness dancing the Kalinka? Because she’s definitely got a set of legs.
  14. Der Spiegel, the most mainstream of German print outlets pushed out a widely-circulated article supporting Russian claims re NATO expansion yesterday titled “New File Found from 1991 Supports Russian Claims”, citing a recently-discovered memo from the British Archives in which German diplomat/ambassador to the US, Jürgen Chrobog, stated that the Soviets were promised no NATO expansion beyond Germany by the US/Brits/France/UK in the two-plus-four format in the early 90s. The article also cites former US diplomat/ex-Asst Sec State for Europe in the early 90s, Raymond Seitz, as saying the same. Prior to the release of the memo, Spiegel also ran two prior articles over past week giving tacit support that Russia’s claim that the West had lied re NATO expansion is - at the very least - a reasonable claim with supporting evidence; specifically saying that the disagreement between the west and Russia re promises for no NATO expansion “is complicated”, which directly contradicts the western position that it is pure Russian propaganda without any validity. Now, this is of course interesting for all of us history nerds, as it adds to the existing archive on this subject, but it doesn’t change the fact that ultimately no formalized agreement was made with the Soviets, so no treaty obligations were broken, thus rendering it an irrelevant point at the end of the day. But it is very significant in the context of current German positioning on this, particularly as no context was provided in the articles demonstrating how this could be contextualized differently. And it is significant that this came out of Der Spiegel, which is THE big boy in German print media. It is the most widely-read current events magazine in Europe and it carries a tremendous amount of weight in Germany…far more than any other publication. And since half of Germans don’t viscerally hate a given media source as a matter of practice, as is the case in the hyper-partisan US, Spiegel matters quite a bit and it won’t be designated to be “Fake News!” by anyone. But most importantly, Der Spiegel has been identified for years as the publication that forms public opinion in Germany more than any other. From a journalistic standpoint in Germany, you couldn’t get any higher profile. The article was then picked up by other large national publications, including Focus and Die Welt, essentially covering the largest read non-tabloid publications in the country and ensuring widespread distribution. In my mind, this could be significant (and I stress could) from a German standpoint. It could just be happenstance in the sense that this memo just happened to be discovered at the time that this issue is front and center. And that’s a valid position. But given the way it has been covered, this very well could indicate that certain corners of the German establishment are trying to prepare the ground for the German people to not only accept, but to actively seek, a firm exclusion of Ukraine from NATO in exchange for some type of deal. But most importantly, it injects a massive degree of “both sides have reasonable claims” into the public discourse here. It can be used to justify domestically Germany’s continued non-alignment on Ukraine and will also provide a huge fig leaf to certain Russian actions under the guise of “they have a valid grievance”…at least up until actual invasion/occupation, at which point we are off to God-knows-where. But if you are preparing to take an avalanche of external PR heat by not including the killing of NS2 unless only the most blatant and expansive form of “invasion and occupation” occurs, this is how you would begin to inoculate yourself as a politician in the eyes of the the electorate, which is ultimately what will be the difference between the end of your political career and continued power. Now to be clear, I am not saying this is the case…Germany could announce as soon as a Russian invasion occurred that NS2 is done. Hell, if I knew for sure I wouldn't be sitting her on a cloudy cold Munich day when the Canary Islands are not too short of a flight away. And this is juicy content and it very well may be just designed for maximum readership. But I am saying is that it could be more to it, as this development is way too convenient for the current German domestic position at the moment. 
The most significant element of the coverage IMO is found in the German language used to describe it: “Wie die Dokument belegt, stimmten Briten, Amerikaner, Deutsche und Franzosen jedoch überein, dass eine Nato-Mitgliedschaft der Osteuropäer inakzeptabel sei.”…”What the document proves (or "attests") is that the British, Americans, Germans and French agreed that NATO membership of Eastern Europeans was “unacceptable”. Either way, this is mainstream German press taking a very hostile position to the US interpretation of what is a fundamental grievance of Putin, so it is notable in that regard. On an another topic, one of the best German political analysts did a deep discussion with the Deutsche Welle last night on the sidelines of the Security Conference where she talked about the internal German tensions right now. She made an interesting statement that I think is worth sharing regarding what is going on here right now, as it really does boil things down to a simple concept: “Germany is a country that depends on American security, Russian energy, and Chinese markets…that is unsustainable and something is going to have to give. And at this point, no one knows which it will eventually be.” Anyway, full articles from Spiegel and Die Welt below. And notice the singling out of NATO chief Stoltenberg from the jump...that is not the tone that Der Spiegel typically takes towards transatlantic institutions. And I have probably distracted with too much German shit today when the real issue is Russia and Ukraine, so I will leave it at that...but there is a lot going on in the legacy German-language media that just isn't making it over into the English language press at the moment, so I thought I would pass it along. And it is stuff that impacts the Ukraine situation on the Continental side. And Die Welt, which is about as mainstream as one can get here, picking up Der Spiegel's reporting:
  15. I take umbrage at your selling of this fair land short, so I fixed it for you. Commentators on the big political show last night said that power blackouts could bring societal destabilization, in which case, the Germans would likely have to continue to buy. But God almighty, the wholesale invasion of occupation of Ukraine by the Russians would make it really, really tough...I think we would be in some type of uncharted territory there. Caspian Report released a great 15 min video on this yesterday. In it he describes that even if Germany WANTED to stop buying, it basically can't. He explains why there are no alternatives that can work at present. Goes into the lack of infrastructure for LNG and the impact it would have on manufacturing, which is what Germany "does". Talks about the political instability that will occur without Russian gas. The video is definitely worth watching in light of current events. Worth noting that the new polls came out today, and the Greens and the SPD continue to slide, with the Center-Right CDU opposition increasing their lead. So that means that the current governing coalition of SPD, Greens and FDP is now underwater for the first time in their short history, which means if the polls are right, and elections were held today, the three governing parties could not assemble a governming coalition and the party of German industry would as a matter of math be required to join as the senior governing party. The CDU talks a transatlantic game, but they are the party of the big multinationals.
  16. Just spitballing here…but I think it depends. If, as Mr. Worldwide (/NoPitBull) and I were discussing, Putin has indeed made the decision to make a complete break with Europe, then it is all over but the invadin'. If he doesn’t see the break as inevitable yet, then I think at this point Putin sees the diplomatic and military paths as now intertwined, and no longer parallel tracks, or “either/or”. So, while yes, the diplomatic paths forward definitely appear to be at a dead end, does that change if the Russians cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea, rendering it a rump, landlocked Ukriaine? Does that change if Russia has decimated the country East of the Dnieper and has some type (even if tenuous) control over that half of Ukraine? Does it change if the Russians implement a siege of Kiev? Does it change if incorporates large swathes of SE Ukrainian Russian-speaking territory into Russia? There are many possibilities for the diplomatic positions to change given events on the ground, and I think Putin could calculate that Western Europe will be so terrified by a demonstration of overwhelming Russian force/control, that they’ll be prone to cut a deal formalizing the neutrality of Ukraine in exchange for his return of the areas seized, which would of course be made with certain strategic gains remaining with him (thinking specifically of carve outs to benefit the Crimean infrastructure problems that he currently has, de jure autonomy for the Donbas, etc). And let’s not kid ourselves…he isn’t crazy for viewing certain Europeans as pussies, because, as we all know, certain ones, ahem *looking out of my window*, are. So, I think you are correct in your view that (for now), diplomatic options are at least in a holding pattern (or, alternatively, dead entirely, if the break has been decided by Putin). But if not, he could have an idea to potentially escalate to some degree, seize certain areas, and pause to allow for diplomatic off ramps/concessions to be made. If no progress, escalate again, seize more territory/inflict more damage, pause to allow for diplomatic off ramps/concessions. And this could eventually get to a point where even if Ukraine holds firm, external parties could resort to bearing down on Ukraine itself to accept things that they don't want to accept, or, alternatively, offering Kiev a huge carrot to cut a deal (a fixed date, albeit far down the road, for EU accession along with regular cash money in exchange for dropping NATO bid and a commitment to formalized neutrality?...again, haven't thought that through so just thinking out loud). There is a precedent for that when you look at how Minsk 2 came to be, albeit as a miniature version of what any future arrangement would be. The Ukrainian military was losing territory to the separatists (along with the Russian little green men) and were in fact on the verge of being trapped in a huge cauldron at Debaltseve, which ultimately did happen in the days immediately following Minsk 2, until they were allowed to retreat in humiliation by the rebels. The difference would be that this time, any concession would be expected to be formalized with robust mechanisms in place to ensure compliance, and in Putin’s mind he would hang this hope on being able to leverage the Europeans to provide political cover for a deal that he found worthwhile. The Russians took Minsk 2 to the UN Security Council, where it was adopted, but after that enforcement on both sides of the aisle was largely impossible due to the weakness of the Germans and French to come up with any leverage points over the process. In my view, this type of deal would be impossible to get if he was dealing with the US alone (or at least with a united West, which it currently is not), as Americans don't have it in them to cut deals at the barrel of a gun...but certain Europeans do. And they tend to have a lot of influence and if Europe got in its head to do this to avoid war spilling over and coax the Ukrainians to go along, it could theoretically happen. As an aside, one thing that went largely unnoticed in the English speaking press (and to a large degree the German speaking press, as well) was that Baerbock may have made a strategic error in her Q&A at the Security Conference on Friday. She specifically said in response to a journalist’s question, “Western allies have prepared sanctions packages for all types of different attack scenarios. We know where the different trigger points are and which ones would then be imposed.” Now, I don’t follow the US media nearly to the degree that I follow German media, but I don’t recall here that “incrementalist approach” being publicly discussed before (but I could be wrong). I thought the whole debate playing out in public was, “Invasion = Maximum Sanctions”. To me, what Baerbock said sounds like a compromise between the Germans and the US to put NS2 on the line, but only at a certain level of aggression…so basically this could be an inadvertent invitation to dip a toe in and see how bad things are at the outset. So, if Putin hasn’t decided to make a full break with Europe, then I think he will not negotiate until after at least an initial display of force with corresponding gains. I think that would be an initial overwhelming destruction of the Ukrainian military on the front lines at the Donbass to show he means business. He could do a ton towards that goal from that vicinity without having to send tanks, which for some reason from a language standpoint has been the indicator of “invasion”. Of course, if he has decided to break, then my entire post is just bullshit. And if he hasn’t, it could still be bullshit.
  17. One thing that I can't wrap my mind around though is how he could actually believe that a puppet could be installed. To be clear, I agree with you that he does view this as a possible option eventually, so what I am trying to say is that I can't understand how he believes that. It just seems so far-fetched to actually implement. Outside of certain pockets in the East, the anti-Russian sentiment galvanized so significantly post-2014, and the place is so awash in weapons of all types, that it would be almost impossible to hold. And on top of that, what security apparatus is he expecting a Kremlin-installed puppet be able to leverage to keep power? Relying on Russian troops to maintain order in the city would be a bloodbath for them. Pulling that in Kiev could make Grozny look like a day at the park for those trying to hold it against the will of the population. So how would he approach that? Surely he can’t think that he can turn the existing Ukrainian security apparatus in his favor. And his pro-Russian elements in the East couldn't just be picked up and moved to Kiev to form some State Security Service, so he couldn’t rely on using them. So the only way he could do that is exactly as you suggested: by brutal and deep suppression of dissent beforehand, which would mean that he truly has decided to completely abandon any attempt to remain connected economically to Europe, as that would eliminate the ability for fence-sitters in western europe to remain sidelined to any degree. But that level of violent suppression would start to resemble genocide given how many would be rounded up/killed, which would be seen as a completely different thing than just carnage in the Donbass/East. He would essentially be making a decision that Europe is completely written off as the more pacifist countries could no longer push for any type of compromise. This self-inflicted complete-and-total break with Europe would then put him completely dependent on Beijing, which Russia has never wanted, but would now be their only hope. If he tries to pull this, IMO it would truly be one of the worst geo-political plays of all time.
  18. Olaf still straddling that fence at the Munich Security Conference today, complete with a potshot directed towards NATO expansion. Won't mention NS2 by name, and reaffirms position re weapons shipments. Praises NATO, but speaks about the need for the reform of the EU and NATO. Also discusses continuing cooperation with Russia and China on important issues, saying one can critique but still work together. Basically just hollow words all the way around from the lil' fella.
  19. So one of the things that I have seen in some videos with physicists/engineers with defense/weapons expertise analyzing that state of Russian military tech is that the Russians are seen by many in the field as having a legitmate claim to possessing the best Electronic Warfare tech in the world. I am an idiot when it comes to this kind of shit, so my question is to what degree, if any, can this EW superiority impact close-range weaponry? For example, can their EW supremacy make a dent in the efficiency of Javelins? I know that they are SACLOS guided, but I am too dumb to understand if the fact that these are deployed in close proximity leaves them less likely to be impacted by EW. Any of you fuckers able to learn me on this?
  20. Dude is great. He is about the most informed there is out there when it comes to Europe. It's probably the best podcast out there for this type of shit.
  21. I cannot recommend the below podcast enough for anyone iterested in high-level, detailed discussions on what is going on in Europe at a geopolitical level. https://www.eurointelligence.com/podcasts It is a roundtable with three very highly capable academics and analysts, including Wolfgang Münchau, who was a Financial Times columnist and editor-in-chief of Financial Times Deutschland. He is syndicated weekly in El Pais, Corriere della Sera in Milan and Handelsblatt (the "German" WSJ). He's really fucking informed. One of the other hosts is a PhD from University of Bonn, who has been a fellow at a few of the academic think tanks over here, who is equally informed, particularly in France and the med. They typically cover European Politics and if you want to know what's going on in the French Elections, or the EU Parliament issues, or in Hungarian Elections, or whatever...they are a great place to just keep up with it at a level that is higher than just what you'd get from just following in the US. They are pro-atlanticist, pro-EU, but very analytical and they make a serious effort to discuss things objectively and deeply. They'll talk about economics, as well. Comes out once a week, last 30-45 minutes, and it is always reasonable and high-level. They also run one of Münchau's articles every week on the site. Good shit. Anyway, at the 17:40 mark of this weeks episode they have a really interesting discussion on the tension within Europe at the moment, and how there is a tension going on certain parts of Europe being pulled to the east with its growing dependency on the Chinese markets. It is a macro view, but it talks about 10-15 years down the road and they come to some really interesting positions on how we are approaching geopolitical crossroads that could go a variety of directions. Stronger towards atlanticism, stronger towards China due to economics. It's a great segment if you are interested in that stuff.
  22. And the refugee topic is hot and heavy on the news tonight. Germany is preparing its anus.
  23. She came in last night but maybe you are right and its something else...but there is something going on out there. I just figured it was her leaving, as its just like it was last night. Dog doesn't know what the fuck is going on...all he knows is that he doesn't like it.
  24. And on a slightly unrelated note, the three helicopters hovering over my neighborhood right now indicate that Kamala Harris must be leaving the Munich Security Conference. The security when she came in last night was insane. Sat out in the yard with the dog for a while watching the one tracking with her along the road leading in from the airport. /CSB
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