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ryskey

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Everything posted by ryskey

  1. WTF everyone knows it was the Germans except for that dumb teenager apparently
  2. Corrected my question per above shitpost. Previous year's win/loss margin probably isn't predictive at all for the next year, depends on who returned from that team.
  3. If you were to regress our final ranking for each of those years with one metric, which one is the most predictive?
  4. It's because we all started arguing on the internet instead
  5. 6ks thru 4 innings today. 11 yesterday. Clearly TSU is a pipeline of Sandy Koufaxes
  6. With the spring game this weekend, I clicked on the thread called 2023 Spring Practice to Fall Camp Thread hoping to see some player updates, how the early enrollees are doing, and maybe some speculation on how the staff will adjust after the losses to the draft/graduation. Last 2 pages =
  7. Dude had to have known that was a big risk. Ignored dozens of warnings to GTFO.
  8. 15 LOB. On one hand, that's a lot of base runners. On the other hand, that's pretty horrible. Top half of the order 12-22 with 5 LOB. Bottom half 3-19 with 10 LOB.
  9. Top of the order 10-18 with 3 LOB, bottom of the order 2-15 with 8 LOB
  10. Weirdest Elite 8 ever for conference representation too Big 12 - 2 Big East - 2 ACC - 1 Mountain West - 1 CUSA - 1 WCC - 1
  11. 100% it was hard to underwrite COVID, but where does one draw the line? Every industry was impacted by COVID. Refinancing here is only a problem if the outstanding loan amount is greater than the property value. That only happens when you buy a property in a bubble and put a ton of debt on it. There has to have been a huge (50%?) write down for some of the property values, depending on how much debt was used to finance all this. Regardless of whether underwriting standards were normal at the time of issuance, they clearly did not incorporate an interest rate sensitivity, and I'm not sure we should feel bad for CRE investors who've lost all their equity because they assumed low interest rates forever. And unfortunately the bank is the bagholder on the negative equity value - shouldn't banks that made a lot of bad loans go under? Individuals and households probably shouldn't be expected to do that, but CRE investors and banks doing CRE loans should be sophisticated enough to do that. Do you know how much of those loans are under water? If it's as widespread as the tweeter is saying then yes this is a problem. I'm bitter because there are lots of businesses that planned well, didn't use a lot of leverage, properly stress-tested their businesses, and aren't asking for help.
  12. Another example of temporary ZIRP - created bubbles wanting to extend the bubble, at least long enough to find a bagholder. Maybe, MAYBE, when underwriting a real estate investment involving lots of debt, run a sensitivity analysis on the most important variable?
  13. Had no idea OU had more tourney wins than UT. They've done well since joining the B12 but looks like they did really well in the 80s. Same for KSU. They were apparently a powerhouse in the 60s and 70s.
  14. They had some bad luck AND they did a lot of things horribly wrong. And lot of that bad luck was their own creation - their depositors were hyper-concentrated in in the most volatile part of the most volatile sector in the economy.
  15. Yes. Agreed that it's crippling to have ~15% of deposits drawn in 2 days. Panic and self-fulfilling prophecy is difficult to stress test against. But that's assuming a bank has reasonably hedged its risk. How much of the panic was from big depositors that had the wherewithal to understand interest rate hedging and how interest rates affect the underlying value of the treasuries in a rising interest rate environment? Even if it's a small percentage, that might have been enough to exacerbate the run to critical levels. It's inexcusable to run any non-speculative business - especially one this size - without addressing the single biggest risk factor in its continued success. Hedge fund wants to take that position - that's fine - LPs' dollars are locked up and presumably able to lose everything. But a commercial bank with $250B of depsosits? That's insane. The incompetence with SVB is staggering, regardless of whether it was kosher with regulations. Where's the common sense? Interest rate swaps matching some percentage of the debt, with the same tenors. Those unrealized hedges carry MTM value and can be liquidated quickly, in theory offsetting the loss on selling treasuries before maturity 1:1. Unless there's some Byzantine regulation I'm unaware of (and please correct me if I'm off here), why was this not done?
  16. By scoring more points than the other team.
  17. Iowa State just went on a huge run and doubled their score
  18. This is fair. So is this. Been mentioned plenty of times, but there's a huge gap between what you think SHOULD happen in a vacuum versus what you think WILL happen with all the constraints imposed by all the politics involved. Answering the latter, Sweet 16 gets him the job.
  19. ryskey

    Rodney Terry

    I'm very far from NIL expert, but according to this random dude on the internet, the most common Euro basketball salaries are between $400-$800k. So NIL would need to get somewhere close to that. I would hope NIL could get Disu $500k? https://www.josecolorado.com/blog/euroleague-basketball-salary
  20. Website still up. Check out the video on tax and liquidity strategies for founders. On its surface, it might just look like standard wealth management. But if you play it out, particularly in light of tech valuations, there's a lot of potential for the bank to exert a ton of leverage over founders and their companies and introduce huge conflicts of interest. https://www.svb.com/private-bank/who-we-help/founders
  21. Everything here stinks. Wretched. The US has the most sophisticated corruption in the world. https://twitter.com/KobeissiLetter/status/1634683511972962313?s=20 https://twitter.com/KobeissiLetter/status/1634605973208801280?s=20 SVB promised to provided an exit of sorts to tech founders based on inflated valuations in return for their commercial banking business. Who's screaming the loudest? VC and tech founders. A lot of the "loans" are of this form, and I have no idea how they'll be valued, so I retract my previous statement about the loan book being sufficient to cover most of the depositor shortfall. A lot of it is crypto-related, so it'll be interesting to see how 3rd party banks value founder equity - which is the collateral for the partial exits SVB provided.
  22. LOL, VC version of toilet paper hoarding
  23. There's something very visceral about bank failures that leads to a lot of strong emotions and speculation. Kind of the same appeal of watching post-apocalyptic movies. Doomporn or whatever. A $15B business had liabilities exceed its assets. That's not uncommon, and many businesses can survive that for a time. This one happened to be a bank. And the nature of this particular business has to plan around the self-fulfilling prophecy of contagious visceral fear and panic. Atrocious risk management by SVB. I'm sure it's worked out before for others in that situation, but holy shit, hedge your risk. It's a stress test that takes 1 tab in a spreadsheet. It's not hard and not complicated. If not interest rate swaps, there are a million other ways to do this. This is not the first time interest rates have shot up and it won't be the last. This is either incompetence or negligence and the market taking care of a very poorly run business. Worst case scenario, if someone values the loan book reasonably, depositors get 90% of their money back, and likely 100% when another bank wins the auction, so the fear is disproportional with respect to the real financial risk - which is $15B of equity and debt wiped out with depositors getting all their money but uncomfortable inconveniences in the meantime.
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