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Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max crashes killing 157


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https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48174797

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The firm said it had inadvertently made an alarm feature optional instead of standard, but insisted that this did not jeopardise flight safety.

All 737 Max planes were grounded in March after an Ethiopian Airlines flight crashed, killing 157 people.

Five months earlier, 189 people were killed in a Lion Air crash.

The worldwide fleet of 737 Max planes totalled 387 aircraft at the time of the grounding.

The feature at issue is known as the Angle of Attack (AOA) Disagree alert and was designed to let pilots know when two different sensors were reporting conflicting data.

The planemaker said it had intended to provide the feature as standard, but did not realise until deliveries had begun that it was only available if airlines purchased an optional indicator.

It said it had intended to deal with the problem in a later software update.

Boeing maintained that the software problem "did not adversely impact airplane safety or operation".

I'm pretty sure the 300+ dead people would disagree with boeing's analysis that I bolded.

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1 hour ago, Captainant said:

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48174797

I'm pretty sure the 300+ dead people would disagree with boeing's analysis that I bolded.

Once again, THE STICK SHAKER GOING OFF on only 1 steering column is your warning. It's loud and it's jolting. A light coming in saying the sensors disagree would just cause a "No Shit" reaction from the pilots because it's already extremely obvious because the left stick is tied to the left AOA sensor and the right stick is tied fo the right AOA sensor. 

 

 

Edited by Pasken
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6 minutes ago, Pasken said:

Once again, THE STICK SHAKER GOING OFF on only 1 steering column is your warning. It's loud and it's jolting. A light coming in saying the sensors disagree would just cause a "No Shit" reaction from the pilots because it's already extremely obvious because the left stick is tied to the left AOA sensor and the right stick is tied fo the right AOA sensor. 

 

 

And when there’s only  1 AoA sensor on your plane?

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Perhaps I’ve misunderstood. Googling seems to indicate that they all have 2, but in some purchase configurations only one output is fed to the MCAS. 

You are saying that one is tied to each stick such that there would be haptic feedback to alert pilots of mismatched output from them, irrespective of a software comparison and warning light. 

Edited by Pato del Muerto
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Just now, Pato del Muerto said:

Perhaps I’ve misunderstood. Googling seems to indicate that they all have 2, but in some purchase configurations only one output is fed to the MCAS. 

You are saying that one is tied to each stick such that there would be haptic feedback to alert pilots of mismatched output from them, irrespective of a software comparison and warning light. 

Only the left stick shaker was triggered while the right was not.  The plane was clearly not in a stall, therefore the crew correctly identified and called out "left AOA vane" as the problem when they noted it only on the left side.

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That makes it stranger to me that dual input and comparison wasn’t standard, as all the hardware was already in place save one wire, and a couple lines of code on comparing input and how to handle mismatched input of greater than x%. 

And the code was written, as the option was there. 

I wonder how much they charged to run that wire and install the different firmware. 

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2 hours ago, Pato del Muerto said:

That makes it stranger to me that dual input and comparison wasn’t standard, as all the hardware was already in place save one wire, and a couple lines of code on comparing input and how to handle mismatched input of greater than x%. 

And the code was written, as the option was there. 

I wonder how much they charged to run that wire and install the different firmware. 

350+ lives

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4 hours ago, Pasken said:

Once again, THE STICK SHAKER GOING OFF on only 1 steering column is your warning. It's loud and it's jolting. A light coming in saying the sensors disagree would just cause a "No Shit" reaction from the pilots because it's already extremely obvious because the left stick is tied to the left AOA sensor and the right stick is tied fo the right AOA sensor. 

So, you're saying it's a good and desirable trait for an aircraft's MCAS system to only use one input with no redundancies in operation? And it's equally desirable that the aircraft was sold as not needing any additional training and being functionally equivalent to other 737's, nevermind that it has completely different (and unstable) flight characteristics?

I don't give a shit if the shakers are in disagreement, what the fuck are the pilots going to do about it if the aircraft keeps trying to plow itself into the ground and MCAS keeps resetting itself from a disabled state? And especially if they're low hour pilots who were told it's the same thing as every other 737 they've flown?

I don't understand why you're defending Boeing so vehemently on this. Boeing knew of these issues months before the planes were widely used, and did nothing. Because they value shareholder profits over customer lives.

Edited by Captainant
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1 hour ago, Captainant said:

And it's equally desirable that the aircraft was sold as not needing any additional training and being functionally equivalent to other 737's, nevermind that it has completely different (and unstable) flight characteristics?

Good grief.  That's so overblown.  Let's talk about this difference in flight characteristics.  You are not the first person on this thread to read something written by an uninformed writer and to post about how the MAX is unstable and nothing like the earlier 737s.  That idea is completely exaggerated and not based on facts.

Yes, the engines are bigger and mounted more forward under the wing.  Yes, this causes a slight pitch up when power is added.  Yes, to recover from a stall you need to pitch down not up.  Those are facts.  Here are some more:

All airplanes pitch up when you add power.  The amount that the MAX pitches up is not unsafe or abnormal.  The only issue is that the stick force required to push that nose down at the slowest airspeeds with power applied is slightly more than the stick force required for earlier 737s.  It's not an excessive amount of pressure required, just a DIFFERENT amount and only at one specific speed.  If it were a completely new airplane nobody would blink an eye at the required stick force.  

This deviation in required stick force is present only in the absolute slowest regime of speeds.  As you get toward that slow airspeed you would first get a buffet alert and at that point the MAX characteristics are still exactly like the NG.  That right there is also slower that 99.999999999% of pilots will ever get even once in their entire career.  Then you must ignore that and get slower.  You will eventually get a very loud "AIRSPEED LOW!" warning over and over again.  I've personally never been this slow and doubt I know anyone who has, except in a sim and on purpose for training.  At this point the MAX still feels and flies exactly the same as an NG.  Let's say you still ignore that and still get slower... Then you get the stick shaker.  It's loud and violent and impossible to miss.  It doesn't vibrate, it shakes hard and loud like a machine gun.  At this point the MAX still feels and flies exactly the same as an NG model.  Then you ignore the shaker, with the LOW AIRSPEED warning still going off, and get even slower.  Now you are in a regime where the stick force required to push the nose down is different from the NG but not excessive if it were not being compared to an NG.  This difference in required stick force is measured in the single digits of pounds and was detected by test equipment but not noticed by most of the test pilots.  But because that 8 pound difference in force was detected, they had add the MCAS.

This is a good time to point out that the MCAS doesn't help you recover from a stall, it simply helps recreate the same amount of stick force in that one speed regime.  The pilot still has to recover with the same technique, the MCAS just makes it feel identical instead of very slightly different.  

The fact that a different amount of stick force is required does not make the airplane unstable.  Not even close to it.  The difference you feel when driving you wife's car vs your own is far greater than the difference in feel between a non-MCAS MAX and a NG model.  

Now none of that is to say the single source design and a few other aspects of it of the MCAS aren't completely fucked up, because they are.  Boeing dropped the ball bigtime on the MCAS, but that doesn't make the MAX as a whole airplane unstable.  It flies beautifully and I'd fly it every day over an NG if they'd let me.   I only have a dozen or so hours in the MAX, no MCAS activations, and it feels exactly like the NG only smoother and more quite.  I love it and can't wait for them to fix the MCAS software.  

 

 

Edited by Your Mom
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1 minute ago, Your Mom said:

Now none of that is to say the single source design and a few other aspects of it of the MCAS aren't completely fucked up, because they are.  Boeing dropped the ball bigtime on the MCAS, but that doesn't make the MAX as a whole airplane unstable.  It flies beautifully and I'd fly it every day if they'd let me.    

Well, it's probably a good thing they grounded them, seeing as two of them went down killing 350+ people, and Boeing is now admitting that they knew about the issue months before people started dying. You're right, better write another essay about how shitty the dead pilots must have been. 

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1 minute ago, Captainant said:

Well, it's probably a good thing they grounded them, seeing as two of them went down killing 350+ people, and Boeing is now admitting that they knew about the issue months before people started dying.

I agree completely.  100%

 

1 minute ago, Captainant said:

You're right, better write another essay about how shitty the dead pilots must have been. 

Go fuck yourself.

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The book The Right Stuff details in length how a test pilot’s instinct was to blame crashes on pilots “screwing the pooch” rather than the equipment because THEY would have successfully overcome the failure.

Of course, the subtext was that they had been conditioned to blame other pilots because they made their living flying dangerous aircraft and couldnt worry about their own mortality. They had to maintain confidence in their ability to overcome technological failures.

I’ve noticed a little of this on this thread, but let’s keep a healthy respect for pilots with knowledge of the details of the failures and what competent pilots normally do.

That being said, this thread is going in circles because of the details of the pilots’ errors keep coming up. I trust pilot understanding of these details and believe their perspective and opinions are extremely valuable. But I’m skeptical of their objectivity and mastery of risk analysis and liability.

You have two planes, similar catastrophes. In assessing risk, doesn’t seem like these pilots were especially incompetent. Otherwise, you’d see a rash of accidents at similar rates on other aircraft by inexperienced airline pilots. Or, you would have read about Boeing’s amazing safety processes and training. And, the two crashes were just coincidences and a just correlated with a massive trend of pilot inexperience.

You could make the argument that new aircraft rollouts are inherently more dangerous because the competency and emergency preparedness of pilots are deteriorating around the globe. But that’s looking less and less relevant as we learn more about Boeing’s faulty processes, training and communication.

I think we can move beyond pilot error on this thread. Pilot error is going to be a given in this new age.

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On 5/6/2019 at 5:23 PM, Your Mom said:

Good grief.  That's so overblown.  Let's talk about this difference in flight characteristics.  You are not the first person on this thread to read something written by an uninformed writer and to post about how the MAX is unstable and nothing like the earlier 737s.  That idea is completely exaggerated and not based on facts.

Yes, the engines are bigger and mounted more forward under the wing.  Yes, this causes a slight pitch up when power is added.  Yes, to recover from a stall you need to pitch down not up.  Those are facts.  Here are some more:

All airplanes pitch up when you add power.  The amount that the MAX pitches up is not unsafe or abnormal.  The only issue is that the stick force required to push that nose down at the slowest airspeeds with power applied is slightly more than the stick force required for earlier 737s.  It's not an excessive amount of pressure required, just a DIFFERENT amount and only at one specific speed.  If it were a completely new airplane nobody would blink an eye at the required stick force.  

This deviation in required stick force is present only in the absolute slowest regime of speeds.  As you get toward that slow airspeed you would first get a buffet alert and at that point the MAX characteristics are still exactly like the NG.  That right there is also slower that 99.999999999% of pilots will ever get even once in their entire career.  Then you must ignore that and get slower.  You will eventually get a very loud "AIRSPEED LOW!" warning over and over again.  I've personally never been this slow and doubt I know anyone who has, except in a sim and on purpose for training.  At this point the MAX still feels and flies exactly the same as an NG.  Let's say you still ignore that and still get slower... Then you get the stick shaker.  It's loud and violent and impossible to miss.  It doesn't vibrate, it shakes hard and loud like a machine gun.  At this point the MAX still feels and flies exactly the same as an NG model.  Then you ignore the shaker, with the LOW AIRSPEED warning still going off, and get even slower.  Now you are in a regime where the stick force required to push the nose down is different from the NG but not excessive if it were not being compared to an NG.  This difference in required stick force is measured in the single digits of pounds and was detected by test equipment but not noticed by most of the test pilots.  But because that 8 pound difference in force was detected, they had add the MCAS.

This is a good time to point out that the MCAS doesn't help you recover from a stall, it simply helps recreate the same amount of stick force in that one speed regime.  The pilot still has to recover with the same technique, the MCAS just makes it feel identical instead of very slightly different.  

The fact that a different amount of stick force is required does not make the airplane unstable.  Not even close to it.  The difference you feel when driving you wife's car vs your own is far greater than the difference in feel between a non-MCAS MAX and a NG model.  

Now none of that is to say the single source design and a few other aspects of it of the MCAS aren't completely fucked up, because they are.  Boeing dropped the ball bigtime on the MCAS, but that doesn't make the MAX as a whole airplane unstable.  It flies beautifully and I'd fly it every day over an NG if they'd let me.   I only have a dozen or so hours in the MAX, no MCAS activations, and it feels exactly like the NG only smoother and more quite.  I love it and can't wait for them to fix the MCAS software.

Mom, that's all great.  And true.  But the LyonAir crew never throttled down from v2.  They were on the opposite end of the spectrum from the place where 8 lbs of stick force makes the airplane fly like an NG.  The MCAS went haywire.  They didn't know how to aviate their way out of the problem.  Dead people.  Lots of them.

It's not just a software problem.  The design is not inherently aerodynamically stable.  By definition, if it was, it wouldn't need multiple aoa comparitors or mcas to begin with.

Now, all of these are actually nits.  It never should have come to this.  Boeing, Congress and the FAA are in a mutual deep-capture death-spiral embrace.

What you should be is pissed off that Boeing is blaming the need for MCAS on the pilots, and the inability of pilots to understand MCAS, for the crashes, while admitting they didn't tell the pilots about MCAS.  And if any of this is untrue, then why are both unions demanding a trip to the simulator for everyone before returning to duty?  Surely, if it's no big deal, that ipad app is enough for a "refresher", right?

I don't want to ride on the damn thing until the guys up front have been raked over the coals in the box, upside down, backwards, dutch rolled, stalled and seagulled to hell and back.

I especially want to see what happens in the box on a total power failure on climb out (i.e. scullied).

Supposedly Boeing has run 50+ flights so far "testing" the "new software".  Why aren't we getting any data?  Where's the beef?

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15 minutes ago, Hagbard Celine said:

It's not just a software problem.  The design is not inherently aerodynamically stable.  By definition, if it was, it wouldn't need multiple aoa comparitors or mcas to begin with.

This is not correct.  All jets have some sort of speed trim to enhance stability.  Every 737 you've ever ridden on has had speed trim and mach trim.  MCAS isn't the first version of it.  737s and just about every other Boeing have always had auto speed trim to augment stability and auto mach trim to counteract mach tuck.  The need for systems like that are not new new or unique to the MAX.  The MCAS isn't designed to make an unstable plane stable, it was designed to make it feel exactly like every other 737 at every airspeed.  There was one low end airspeed where it took 8 pounds more pressure to push the nose down and so for common type certification it needed an MCAS to artificially remove that 8 pounds.  Had it been a all-new type and not needed to feel like the older 737s the MCAS would have been uneccessary.  

 

22 minutes ago, Hagbard Celine said:

What you should be is pissed off that Boeing is blaming the need for MCAS on the pilots, and the inability of pilots to understand MCAS, for the crashes, while admitting they didn't tell the pilots about MCAS.  And if any of this is untrue, then why are both unions demanding a trip to the simulator for everyone before returning to duty? 

I am pissed about exactly that.  My union speaks for me on the MCAS issue.   

44 minutes ago, Hagbard Celine said:

Supposedly Boeing has run 50+ flights so far "testing" the "new software".  Why aren't we getting any data?  Where's the beef?

Because 50 flights is nothing.  We flew 41,000 flights with the old software without a problem when the problem was definitely lurking.  I'm fine with the new software taking more than 50 hours before it's rubber-stamped "Ops check good"  

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1 hour ago, Hagbard Celine said:

But the LyonAir crew never throttled down from v2.  They were on the opposite end of the spectrum from the place where 8 lbs of stick force makes the airplane fly like an NG.  The MCAS went haywire.  They didn't know how to aviate their way out of the problem.  Dead people.  Lots of them.

All of which points to an MCAS system that went haywire and was completely fucked.  I haven't stuck up for the MCAS at all... ever.  The reason they were at the opposite end of the spectrum is because they kept all that power in and because the MCAS kept adding more nose down pitch trim over and over again and to a point that the stab trim had more authority than the elevator.  All of that is an indictment on the MCAS design but not an indictment on the overall design and stability of the air frame.  That malfunctioning MCAS stuck onto any other airplane would have had the same results.  
 

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But isn't the max way more unstable compared to earlier 737's due to the newer and bigger engines. I read that the 737 is low to the ground due to it's old design. Now they have to find ways to get the newer bigger engines on there which creates stability issues. For instance they have had to move them forward which is problematic

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20 minutes ago, Your Mom said:

All of which points to an MCAS system that went haywire and was completely fucked.  I haven't stuck up for the MCAS at all... ever.  The reason they were at the opposite end of the spectrum is because they kept all that power in and because the MCAS kept adding more nose down pitch trim over and over again and to a point that the stab trim had more authority than the elevator.  All of that is an indictment on the MCAS design but not an indictment on the overall design and stability of the air frame.  That malfunctioning MCAS stuck onto any other airplane would have had the same results.

The problem is the general public, sheeple, cattle, kettles and media don't understand the distinction between the airframe and the composite system that includes the airframe, the software, the systems and the drivers.

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1 hour ago, Updawg said:

But isn't the max way more unstable compared to earlier 737's due to the newer and bigger engines. I read that the 737 is low to the ground due to it's old design. Now they have to find ways to get the newer bigger engines on there which creates stability issues. For instance they have had to move them forward which is problematic

My thoughts on that here:

https://www.surlyhorns.com/board/index.php?/topic/8201-ethiopian-airlines-737-max-crashes-killing-157/&do=findComment&comment=1262960

1 hour ago, Hagbard Celine said:

The problem is the general public, sheeple, cattle, kettles and media don't understand the distinction between the airframe and the composite system that includes the airframe, the software, the systems and the drivers.

Yep.  No argument there.  My only point is that if you take away the MCAS it's a perfectly good airplane, other than feeling slightly different at extreme slow speeds, which is not really a fault, it just means you wouldn't get a common type certificate for it.  

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derp

Audio recording reveals Boeing resisted angry calls from pilots for 737 Max fix in November

Pilots at American Airlines angrily pushed Boeing officials at a tense meeting in November for a fix to its 737 Max aircraft that crashed in Indonesia in October.

They asked Boeing to take emergency action that would have likely grounded the Max, but Boeing officials resisted.

The pilots union shared an audio recording of the meeting with the Dallas Morning News and New York Times.

Weeks after the first fatal crash of Boeing’s popular 737 Max aircraft in October, American Airlines pilots angrily pushed company officials to fix the anti-stall software that has now been implicated in two deadly Max crashes, the Dallas Morning News reported.

Pilots asked Boeing at a private meeting in November to take emergency action that would have likely grounded the Max, but Boeing officials resisted, according to an audio recording of the meeting reviewed by the Dallas Morning News and New York Times.

The meeting attendees included Mike Sinnett, a Boeing vice president; Craig Bomben, a top Boeing test pilot; and senior lobbyist John Moloney, the Times reported.

Sinnett reportedly told the pilots at the meeting that the company was working on a software fix that would be ready in as little as six weeks, and it would not rush the process, according to the Times. He also said it was unclear whether the new system was to blame in the Lion Air crash, which killed 189 people.

“No one has yet to conclude that the sole cause of this was this function on the airplane,” Sinnett said at the meeting, which took place at the Allied Pilots Association headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. The group represents American Airlines pilots.

The Dallas Morning News said the union recorded the meeting without Boeing’s knowledge and shared the audio with reporters because it was concerned Boeing wasn’t treating the situation as an emergency at the time.

The pilots said they were not aware of the Max’s anti-stall software system, known as MCAS. And they were angry that the system was not disclosed to them until after the October crash in Indonesia.

“These guys didn’t even know the damn system was on the airplane — nor did anybody else,” American pilot Michael Michaelis said at the meeting.

Michaelis, the union’s head of safety, also said Boeing should push the Federal Aviation Administration to issue an additional emergency airworthiness directive in order to update the software.

“My question to you, as Boeing, is why wouldn’t you say this is the smartest thing to do?” Michaelis asked. “Say we’re going to do everything we can to protect that traveling public in accordance with what our pilots unions are telling us.”

Todd Wissing, another American pilot, was angry the MCAS system was not included in the Max training manual.

“I would think that there would be a priority of putting explanations of things that could kill you,” Wissing told Boeing executives.

Sinnett said the company did not believe that pilots needed to know about the software, since they were already trained on how to behave in emergency scenarios.

“I don’t know that understanding this system would’ve changed the outcome on this. In a million miles, you’re going to maybe fly this airplane, maybe once you’re going to see this, ever,” Sinnett said. “So we try not to overload the crews with information that’s unnecessary so they actually know the information we believe is important.”

Sinnett did acknowledge that Boeing was investigating potential errors in the jet’s design.

“One of the questions will be, is our design assumption wrong?” he said. “We’re going through that whole thought process of, were our assumptions really even valid when we did this?”

Boeing is still working on a software upgrade as the Max remains grounded through the summer. The company has revealed that it knew about the problem linked to sensors in the Max jet the year before the Lion Air crash, but did not issue a fix.

Weeks after a second Max crash in Ethiopia, which killed 157 people, Boeing acknowledged for the first time that bad data feeding into the MCAS system played a role in the crashes.

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1 hour ago, Hagbard Celine said:

derp

Audio recording reveals Boeing resisted angry calls from pilots for 737 Max fix in November

Pilots at American Airlines angrily pushed Boeing officials at a tense meeting in November for a fix to its 737 Max aircraft that crashed in Indonesia in October.

They asked Boeing to take emergency action that would have likely grounded the Max, but Boeing officials resisted.

The pilots union shared an audio recording of the meeting with the Dallas Morning News and New York Times.

Weeks after the first fatal crash of Boeing’s popular 737 Max aircraft in October, American Airlines pilots angrily pushed company officials to fix the anti-stall software that has now been implicated in two deadly Max crashes, the Dallas Morning News reported.

Pilots asked Boeing at a private meeting in November to take emergency action that would have likely grounded the Max, but Boeing officials resisted, according to an audio recording of the meeting reviewed by the Dallas Morning News and New York Times.

The meeting attendees included Mike Sinnett, a Boeing vice president; Craig Bomben, a top Boeing test pilot; and senior lobbyist John Moloney, the Times reported.

Sinnett reportedly told the pilots at the meeting that the company was working on a software fix that would be ready in as little as six weeks, and it would not rush the process, according to the Times. He also said it was unclear whether the new system was to blame in the Lion Air crash, which killed 189 people.

“No one has yet to conclude that the sole cause of this was this function on the airplane,” Sinnett said at the meeting, which took place at the Allied Pilots Association headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. The group represents American Airlines pilots.

The Dallas Morning News said the union recorded the meeting without Boeing’s knowledge and shared the audio with reporters because it was concerned Boeing wasn’t treating the situation as an emergency at the time.

The pilots said they were not aware of the Max’s anti-stall software system, known as MCAS. And they were angry that the system was not disclosed to them until after the October crash in Indonesia.

“These guys didn’t even know the damn system was on the airplane — nor did anybody else,” American pilot Michael Michaelis said at the meeting.

Michaelis, the union’s head of safety, also said Boeing should push the Federal Aviation Administration to issue an additional emergency airworthiness directive in order to update the software.

“My question to you, as Boeing, is why wouldn’t you say this is the smartest thing to do?” Michaelis asked. “Say we’re going to do everything we can to protect that traveling public in accordance with what our pilots unions are telling us.”

Todd Wissing, another American pilot, was angry the MCAS system was not included in the Max training manual.

“I would think that there would be a priority of putting explanations of things that could kill you,” Wissing told Boeing executives.

Sinnett said the company did not believe that pilots needed to know about the software, since they were already trained on how to behave in emergency scenarios.

“I don’t know that understanding this system would’ve changed the outcome on this. In a million miles, you’re going to maybe fly this airplane, maybe once you’re going to see this, ever,” Sinnett said. “So we try not to overload the crews with information that’s unnecessary so they actually know the information we believe is important.”

Sinnett did acknowledge that Boeing was investigating potential errors in the jet’s design.

“One of the questions will be, is our design assumption wrong?” he said. “We’re going through that whole thought process of, were our assumptions really even valid when we did this?”

Boeing is still working on a software upgrade as the Max remains grounded through the summer. The company has revealed that it knew about the problem linked to sensors in the Max jet the year before the Lion Air crash, but did not issue a fix.

Weeks after a second Max crash in Ethiopia, which killed 157 people, Boeing acknowledged for the first time that bad data feeding into the MCAS system played a role in the crashes.

FUPM

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Just like no one went to jail for leveraging the world financial system 50 to 1.

But a young DA looking to stir the shitstorm could easily do so.

 

I'm not sold that the MAX design is inherently "not flawed" in a way that makes "software fixes" and AOA comparators nothing more than permanent stopgaps that don't actually fix the problem of the moment arm of the engines being too far forward.

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34 minutes ago, Hagbard Celine said:

Just like no one went to jail for leveraging the world financial system 50 to 1.

But a young DA looking to stir the shitstorm could easily do so.

 

I'm not sold that the MAX design is inherently "not flawed" in a way that makes "software fixes" and AOA comparators nothing more than permanent stopgaps that don't actually fix the problem of the moment arm of the engines being too far forward.

This ^^  Mechanical issues should be fixed with actual physical design revisions whenever possible.

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On 5/16/2019 at 8:31 AM, Hagbard Celine said:

I'm not sold that the MAX design is inherently "not flawed" in a way that makes "software fixes" and AOA comparators nothing more than permanent stopgaps that don't actually fix the problem of the moment arm of the engines being too far forward.

Your Mom’s explanations of how the Max flies beautifully are not persuasive enough?

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On 5/15/2019 at 6:44 PM, Hagbard Celine said:

derp

Audio recording reveals Boeing resisted angry calls from pilots for 737 Max fix in November

Pilots at American Airlines angrily pushed Boeing officials at a tense meeting in November for a fix to its 737 Max aircraft that crashed in Indonesia in October.

They asked Boeing to take emergency action that would have likely grounded the Max, but Boeing officials resisted.

The pilots union shared an audio recording of the meeting with the Dallas Morning News and New York Times.

Weeks after the first fatal crash of Boeing’s popular 737 Max aircraft in October, American Airlines pilots angrily pushed company officials to fix the anti-stall software that has now been implicated in two deadly Max crashes, the Dallas Morning News reported.

Pilots asked Boeing at a private meeting in November to take emergency action that would have likely grounded the Max, but Boeing officials resisted, according to an audio recording of the meeting reviewed by the Dallas Morning News and New York Times.

The meeting attendees included Mike Sinnett, a Boeing vice president; Craig Bomben, a top Boeing test pilot; and senior lobbyist John Moloney, the Times reported.

Sinnett reportedly told the pilots at the meeting that the company was working on a software fix that would be ready in as little as six weeks, and it would not rush the process, according to the Times. He also said it was unclear whether the new system was to blame in the Lion Air crash, which killed 189 people.

“No one has yet to conclude that the sole cause of this was this function on the airplane,” Sinnett said at the meeting, which took place at the Allied Pilots Association headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. The group represents American Airlines pilots.

The Dallas Morning News said the union recorded the meeting without Boeing’s knowledge and shared the audio with reporters because it was concerned Boeing wasn’t treating the situation as an emergency at the time.

The pilots said they were not aware of the Max’s anti-stall software system, known as MCAS. And they were angry that the system was not disclosed to them until after the October crash in Indonesia.

“These guys didn’t even know the damn system was on the airplane — nor did anybody else,” American pilot Michael Michaelis said at the meeting.

Michaelis, the union’s head of safety, also said Boeing should push the Federal Aviation Administration to issue an additional emergency airworthiness directive in order to update the software.

“My question to you, as Boeing, is why wouldn’t you say this is the smartest thing to do?” Michaelis asked. “Say we’re going to do everything we can to protect that traveling public in accordance with what our pilots unions are telling us.”

Todd Wissing, another American pilot, was angry the MCAS system was not included in the Max training manual.

“I would think that there would be a priority of putting explanations of things that could kill you,” Wissing told Boeing executives.

Sinnett said the company did not believe that pilots needed to know about the software, since they were already trained on how to behave in emergency scenarios.

“I don’t know that understanding this system would’ve changed the outcome on this. In a million miles, you’re going to maybe fly this airplane, maybe once you’re going to see this, ever,” Sinnett said. “So we try not to overload the crews with information that’s unnecessary so they actually know the information we believe is important.”

Sinnett did acknowledge that Boeing was investigating potential errors in the jet’s design.

“One of the questions will be, is our design assumption wrong?” he said. “We’re going through that whole thought process of, were our assumptions really even valid when we did this?”

Boeing is still working on a software upgrade as the Max remains grounded through the summer. The company has revealed that it knew about the problem linked to sensors in the Max jet the year before the Lion Air crash, but did not issue a fix.

Weeks after a second Max crash in Ethiopia, which killed 157 people, Boeing acknowledged for the first time that bad data feeding into the MCAS system played a role in the crashes.

Pretty damning. Our pilot error advocates have gone radio silent lately. 

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31 minutes ago, JimmyJames said:

Pretty damning. Our pilot error advocates have gone radio silent lately. 

Eskimo hit on it earlier. Pilots' brains are wired to believe they can handle any machine and situation.Add to that it is a tight knit fraternity with plenty of others with the same ego. It takes some pilots saying something is FUBAR before other pilots will admit that it just might be FUBAR as they don’t want to admit there may be something they can’t overcome. It is interesting that American Airline pilots were all saying it was FUBAR so early on.

 

Edited by ShaggyBevo RIP
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No pilot in this thread has ever said MCAS was anything other than completely fucked up.  I've stuck up for the basic design of the airframe and that the whole engines forward and higher thing is overblown, but that completely separate from the MCAS design.  I'm as disgusted as anyone about the design of the MCAS and the lack of communication about it though.

 

 

Edited by Your Mom
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Yep.  No argument there.  My only point is that if you take away the MCAS it's a perfectly good airplane, other than feeling slightly different at extreme slow speeds, which is not really a fault, it just means you wouldn't get a common type certificate for it.  

What’s unclear is the performance of the aircraft at high angles of attack as it approaches a stall, and the settings of the flaps and elevator. Anytime you move lift forward on a plane it’s not so much the normal operating regions that become problematic, but the near-stall conditions.
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From the uninformed everyday passenger POV, Boeing tried to stretch a profitable airframe beyond it's capabilities so they installed a F-117/B-2-esque computer pilot input override and didn't tell anyone because the 737 Max is really profitable and pilots don't need to know about that stuff.

Kinda like the MD-11 we know it's fucked design and will deal with it eventually but it's new and we gotta make money now syndrome.

Edited by RPM
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51 minutes ago, Dbeasy said:


What’s unclear is the performance of the aircraft at high angles of attack as it approaches a stall, and the settings of the flaps and elevator. Anytime you move lift forward on a plane it’s not so much the normal operating regions that become problematic, but the near-stall conditions.

There is nothing unclear about that.  ALL big jets do it.  Every airliner you have ever ridden on in your life (except maybe Armybrat) has some some version of automatic speed trim to account for it.

The new design and adding the LEAP engines added 8 pounds of stick force to recover from that near-stall speed.  MCAS is there to alleviate that 8 pounds of stick force so they could still certify it as a 737.  Had they certified it as anything other than a 737 nobody would have cared about that 8 pounds.  The 8 pounds of extra force is not a huge problem and the only reason it was deemed necessary to remove it is the keep the name 737 on it.  

 

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1 minute ago, Your Mom said:

There is nothing unclear about that.  ALL big jets do it.  Every airliner you have ever ridden on in your life (except maybe Armybrat) has some some version of automatic speed trim to account for it.

The new design and adding the LEAP engines added 8 pounds of stick force to recover from that near-stall speed.  MCAS is there to alleviate that 8 pounds of stick force so they could still certify it as a 737.  Had they certified it as anything other than a 737 nobody would have cared about that 8 pounds.  The 8 pounds of extra force is not a huge problem and the only reason it was deemed necessary to remove it is the keep he name 737 on it.

 

Well for not being a huge deal it's killed hundreds in a matter of months.  Something about that extra thrust is deadly, and it's catastrophically confused 2 flight crews needlessly according to your post, it seems.

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8 minutes ago, Onboard 2.0 said:

Well for not being a huge deal it's killed hundreds in a matter of months.  Something about that extra thrust is deadly, and it's catastrophically confused 2 flight crews needlessly according to your post, it seems.

Are you retarded?  No, it hasn't killed anyone.  I'm talking apples, you're talking oranges.  

I'm talking about the basic airframe and engine set up.  You're talking about the AOA failure and MCAS activation.  The basic airframe set up and location of the engines and didn't kill anyone.  A completely fucked up design of the MCAS logic and a failed AOA probe had a large hand in killing many people.  The post you quoted me on was talking about extra stick force to recover from a stall.  Neither of these airplanes was any where near a stall, quite the opposite in fact. 

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1 minute ago, Your Mom said:

Are you retarded?  No, it hasn't killed anyone.  I'm talking apples, you're talking oranges.  

I'm talking about the basic airframe and engine set up.  You're talking about the AOA failure and MCAS activation.  The basic airframe set up and location of the engines didn't kill anyone.  A completely fucked up design of the MCAS logic and a failed AOA probe had a large hand in killing many peoople.

Are you just an asshole ?  The entire issue seems to stem from large/ more powerful engines and their location.  I thought the MCAS was installed to counteract that issue.  Some reason you're being an asshole ?

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1 minute ago, Onboard 2.0 said:

Are you just an asshole ?  The entire issue seems to stem from large/ more powerful engines and their location.  I thought the MCAS was installed to counteract that issue.  Some reason you're being an asshole ?

The engines are only considered too large, too high, and too far forward when you are trying to keep the exact same characteristics of the older 737s.  Had they named the airplane anything other than a 737 they could have left MCAS off the airplane altogether.  If this were a brand new type of airplane the pitch-up tendency from the engine location would not have been considered excessive.

 

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9 hours ago, JimmyJames said:

Pretty damning. Our pilot error advocates have gone radio silent lately. 

The pilot error advocates have grown tired of trying to educate rubes on the realities of the planes they fly in, and have acknowledged all along that the whole thing was f’d up. What you can’t get through your thick skull is that correct pilot action likely saves the day. 

Now feel free to tell me that I don’t know about how aviation unions interact with management groups, and how they use public pronouncements to apply pressure to those bodies. You kindly STFU quick there didn’t you. I can keep talking intelligently about the subject at hand. You can only parrot articles and jump up and down like a trained monkey trying to prove a point you still don’t understand. There was no magic bullet. There seldom is in any accident. 

Edited by Bobby_Batronic
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2 minutes ago, Your Mom said:

The engines are only considered too large, too high, and too far forward when you are trying to keep the exact same characteristics of the older 737s.  Had they named the airplane anything other than a 737 they could have left MCAS off the airplane altogether.  If this were a brand new type of airplane the pitch-up tendency from the engine location would not have been considered excessive.

 

Yup. They wanted to keep the flight characteristics the same to retain the common type rating. 

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