Jump to content

Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max crashes killing 157


Nueces River Rat

Recommended Posts

1 hour ago, Bobby_Batronic said:

Both work fine. The AOA sensor in the Lion Air Max was talking to the MCAS. A graphic display wasn’t required for this though I suspect it will be in the future to assuage the outcry generated so far. The larger point is that you hit the stab cutout switches if the plane pitches down uncommanded. It doesn’t matter why. It doesn’t matter if you have the indicator on the primary flight display. You do the memory item and fly the plane. 

I know the bolded text applied to the predicate statement, but it also seems to apply to the rest of this -- the MCAS with or without the "optional add on" works fine.  

Except that's not true.  The argument for "it works fine" is what you and other folks who know their way around a cockpit have posted.  It's not a wrong argument, in a vacuum.  However, the argument for "no, it does NOT work fine" is two planes smashed to bits in a nosedive, killing all on board.  Those are two really, really heavy countervailing pieces of evidence.

The scenario of "MCAS, but without the add-on" looks to have killed two planes full of people.  There's no world in which that result = "works just fine."

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

1 hour ago, Bobby_Batronic said:

The AOA sensor is installed. If it weren’t the MCAS wouldn’t have pitched down based on erroneous AOA sensor inputs. The option not installed on the Lion Air Max per the information above was a graphic description of that AOA’s information. 

Again, the general public is thoroughly ignorant of the realities of options on airliners. I’ll give you an example. All airliners have ice detectors. In the Airbus, for example, an airline can opt for the fairly standard electronic installation which consists of a heated mast that vibrates, and any interruption of that vibration indicates ice. This indication is displayed as a message for the pilots. OR, there’s a small mast that protrudes from the center winsdscreen post that the pilots can stare at and see if it’s accumulating ice. 

One is gee whiz and one is bare bones simple to the point of near embarrassment. Both work fine. The AOA sensor in the Lion Air Max was talking to the MCAS. A graphic display wasn’t required for this though I suspect it will be in the future to assuage the outcry generated so far. The larger point is that you hit the stab cutout switches if the plane pitches down uncommanded. It doesn’t matter why. It doesn’t matter if you have the indicator on the primary flight display. You do the memory item and fly the plane. 

my hot takes now that the data is "in":

1. The Airbusization of global aviation culture.  In my opinion the joystick control paradigm (regardless of whether or not the max8 does or does not have a traditional layout) in conjunction with the exponential growth of commercial aviation in the 3rd world over the past 30 years has made for a bad brew.  Inherently, one guy flys with his left hand and the other with his right hand.  Inherently, the brain mechanisms and motor control of "left vs. right" hemispheres being relied upon to equally process and execute a complete fidelity model is again in my opinion fundamentally flawed.

2. The Right Stuff.  It used to be, up until about 10 years ago, you could count on the guy in the left seat, for almost every airline in the world, having been blind, upside down, inverted, and supersonic at some point in their pre-commercial military careers.  The last of the Vietnam-era guys retired 10 years ago.  This is not to slag on those of you who currently drive a 1000 souls a day across the sky.  But in my opinion, this is a problem in Africa and South Asia, the arabian carriers excluded.

3. "Optional" safety packages, in general, as a marketing "feature".  That's full aggy.  "Declaration of War - the Short Form" (banzai holla).

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

3 hours ago, Bobby_Batronic said:

The same public who wouldn’t trust Fox News or CNN any farther than they could throw each respective HQ building is buying this s**t hook, line and sinker from aviation news experts who don’t know their ass from a hole in the ground. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gell-Mann_amnesia_effect

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The only add on that may have caused the crash is the completely unnecessary MCAS. The more forward position of the Leap engines don't create a moment and increasing AoA that's unrecognizable or unrecoverable using basic approach to stall procedures that you learn on your 3rd lesson of private pilot training. Yet, Boeing's customer is the world now not just ual, aa, swa, dal.

Somehow we flew round dial -300s, NGs up to and including the 900er under a single type rating. Same with the the 757/767 fleet. 757-200 up to the 767-400 under the same fleet. None of these planes have similar characteristics imo, but with training and experience it works.

Now we build and train to the lowest common denominator and the results aren't surprising to me. We don't have an AoA indicator in our fleet. Hell that Airbus engine and wing anti ice seems like some librul commie conspiracy compared to the 737.

  • Like 3
Link to comment
Share on other sites

3 minutes ago, DaysOff said:

The only add on that may have caused the crash is the completely unnecessary MCAS. The more forward position of the Leap engines don't create a moment and increasing AoA that's unrecognizable or unrecoverable using basic approach to stall procedures that you learn on your 3rd lesson of private pilot training.

Multiple planes have gone down because pilots were pulling the nose up to get out of a stall instead of putting it down to gain speed. Despite being trained pilots, it's human nature to pull up if you're falling which is exacerbated in an emergency. 

 

 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

50 minutes ago, GringoSalado said:

Do we know the "add-on" would have prevented either crash?

In fairness, no, that has not been finally determined.  At this moment, it only looks that way -- we'll see what the final findings are.  BUT, while there might be thousands of folks who want to fly around in these birds in the coming days.....a preliminary finding wouldn't be out of place.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Multiple planes have gone down because pilots were pulling the nose up to get out of a stall instead of putting it down to gain speed. Despite being trained pilots, it's human nature to pull up if you're falling which is exacerbated in an emergency. 
 
 
None were allegedly anywhere near a stall.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

4 minutes ago, DaysOff said:
22 minutes ago, Pasken said:
Multiple planes have gone down because pilots were pulling the nose up to get out of a stall instead of putting it down to gain speed. Despite being trained pilots, it's human nature to pull up if you're falling which is exacerbated in an emergency. 
 
 

None were allegedly anywhere near a stall.


I didn't say these two MAX crashes were. I'm saying that there is a decent reason for the feature to exist because it's not (as you put it) a skill that is natural to pilots simply because they learn it early on because multiple flight crashes resulted from improper stall recovery procedures.

Edited by Pasken
Link to comment
Share on other sites

29 minutes ago, DaysOff said:

The only add on that may have caused the crash is the completely unnecessary MCAS. The more forward position of the Leap engines don't create a moment and increasing AoA that's unrecognizable or unrecoverable using basic approach to stall procedures that you learn on your 3rd lesson of private pilot training. Yet, Boeing's customer is the world now not just ual, aa, swa, dal. 

That's one aspect that I hadn't heard discussed much. I assumed that the decrease in the AoA window was so drastic (or the consequences so severe for going outside of it) that the MCAS in some form would be necessary. That is, the nose would pitch up so much or so quickly that the plane would go into an unrecoverable stall without MCAS. /not a pilot

Link to comment
Share on other sites

2 hours ago, Telegraph_it said:

Bobby agreed on complexities and media being terrible when it comes to reporting on aviation. I guess the potential argument is some pilots apparently needed  that graphic display to not put the plane in the ground - even if they had 1,000 of hours.

Anyway I don’t fly anything nearly as advanced and it boggles my mind how a pilot would not be able to maintain level flight assuming everything else is working and clear conditions. 

Words to live by: Fly the plane. Don’t do it the other way around. 

Plane the fly ?  You aviation folks, and your weird corporate speak.

Edited by Onboard 2.0
Link to comment
Share on other sites

1 hour ago, tucker said:

All I can think about is self driving cars and how the poors won't be able to afford the upgrades so the software malfunctions resulting in death. 

2 big differences

a) you can program a car to pull over to the side of the road if there are issues or problems

ii) there are roughly 35,000 (estimated about 1.2 million globally )traffic fatalities in the US a year, far exceeding the global commercial plane fatalities. So if there are fatalities from self driving cars, remember to compare it to the number of fatalities from idiot driven cars

Link to comment
Share on other sites

1 hour ago, Pasken said:


I didn't say these two MAX crashes were. I'm saying that there is a decent reason for the feature to exist because it's not (as you put it) a skill that is natural to pilots simply because they learn it early on because multiple flight crashes resulted from improper stall recovery procedures.

In theory, yes there's a reason for it to exist.  In practice, that fancy new feature designed to prevent crashes has caused two of them within a year of being introduced. 

First do no harm.  

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

10 minutes ago, bschoolprof said:

In theory, yes there's a reason for it to exist.  In practice, that fancy new feature designed to prevent crashes has caused two of them within a year of being introduced. 

First do no harm.  

But we don't know the number of crashes that would have occurred under the counterfactual.

 

What a shit show. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

3 hours ago, Hagbard Celine said:

my hot takes now that the data is "in":

1. The Airbusization of global aviation culture.  In my opinion the joystick control paradigm (regardless of whether or not the max8 does or does not have a traditional layout) in conjunction with the exponential growth of commercial aviation in the 3rd world over the past 30 years has made for a bad brew.  Inherently, one guy flys with his left hand and the other with his right hand.  Inherently, the brain mechanisms and motor control of "left vs. right" hemispheres being relied upon to equally process and execute a complete fidelity model is again in my opinion fundamentally flawed.

2. The Right Stuff.  It used to be, up until about 10 years ago, you could count on the guy in the left seat, for almost every airline in the world, having been blind, upside down, inverted, and supersonic at some point in their pre-commercial military careers.  The last of the Vietnam-era guys retired 10 years ago.  This is not to slag on those of you who currently drive a 1000 souls a day across the sky.  But in my opinion, this is a problem in Africa and South Asia, the arabian carriers excluded.

3. "Optional" safety packages, in general, as a marketing "feature".  That's full aggy.  "Declaration of War - the Short Form" (banzai holla).

Having worked with everyone from ex-cops, to crop dusters to former aggressor instructors I can categorically state that having flown for the military does not make for better professional airline pilots. It’s vastly overrated by, and stop me if you’re sensing a theme, an ignorant public. 

Experience matters for sure, but flying for Uncle Sam is no guarantor of ability. Some of the worst pilots I’ve ever known flew large military transports and or F-15’s, and the best I’ve ever flown with bar none had a two year JC degree and flew King Airs for the state of Texas. 

I’d be crapping my pants as an organization if I were Ethiopian and a full boat of people just died due largely to pilot error and I had just put a 200 hour first officer in the front of an airliner. 

Edited by Bobby_Batronic
  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

13 minutes ago, Bobby_Batronic said:

Pilot error, followed by faulty AOA sensor, followed by shitty training and maintenance would come before MCAS as proximate cause.

All that you said boils down to this.

Almost ANY major calamity -- air crash, dam failure, whatever -- comes down to something like that, a sequence of factors, all of which had to happen for the failure to occur.  But the argument/response to that isn't "well, can't point the finger at factor 3, because of factors 1-2 and 4-5."  When you have a technical system that creates a higher risk of pilot error, leading to a higher risk of crash, that's a bad thing.  I don't know how to state it much more plainly than that.  Yes, you're right, the plane STILL shouldn't crash when this issue occurs....but the LIKELIHOOD of it crashing goes up when it occurs.

If the manufacturer can remove that enhanced likelihood with a technical fix.....then that's what should happen.  And if it was KNOWN, that should have happened a while ago.  If there's a weak link, and it can be removed, it should be removed.

None of this excuses pilot error, poor training, etc.  All factors that can be addressed should be addressed.  But it's dead-wrong to skip over and just say 'hey, have top-notch pilots who are on their A-game, and this won't happen."  

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

the arabian carriers excluded

Drinkin' buddy of mine is retired AA 777 Captain.  He said that he's been in the AA sim with a lot of foreign pilots, and that the Saudis were head-and-shoulders above everybody else.  He said he'd fly a Saudi airline without hesitation. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

6 minutes ago, Gil Bang said:

 

 

Drinkin' buddy of mine is retired AA 777 Captain.  He said that he's been in the AA sim with a lot of foreign pilots, and that the Saudis were head-and-shoulders above everybody else.  He said he'd fly a Saudi airline without hesitation. 

That’s because there is no alcohol served on their planes. Made that mistake once.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Incorrect. MCAS didn’t kill two planes worth of people. Pilots failing to react to an inadvertent nose down pitch input correctly as per their MEMORY ITEMS, killed two planes worth of people. Someone so panicked that they didn’t even attempt to do something that they are supposed to do by rote with no hesitation isn’t  going to look at their instrumentation, interpolate an AOA indication and then save the plane.
We’ll find out about the Ethiopian crash, but supposedly the Lion Air crew spent 17 seoconds screaming and pulling against the control column instead of doing the one thing that they are supposed to do to stop erroneous pitch inputs in a 737. Pilot error, followed by faulty AOA sensor, followed by shitty training and maintenance would come before MCAS as proximate cause. But the general public is shitting themselves over something they don’t understand stoked by media outlets that couldn’t differentiate between a greyhound bus and a Boeing. 
Tell me, how many of you are gnashing your teeth every day over the rash of fume events happening in airliners today that are hospitalizing and killing crew and pax?  What’s that?  You don’t know anything about it?  Hmmm.
How many of you are losing their minds over the fact that the average Pratt and Whitney 1100B geared turbofan engine had a life expectancy of 600 hours under the wing of an airliner until very recently, and that P/W was paying through the nose to make airlines whole for their grounded airplanes?  I can name an airline that’s had to replace 50+ of these motors at P/W’s expense because the motors kept eating thenselves until recently. Oh, you didn’t?
How many of you still don’t understand that an Airbus will react in the same way given faulty AOA information, and will require the pilots to disable systems to correct a pitch down as well?  Air France killed a boatload of people in one shot due to similar pilot error and yet their is no worldwide panic over low speed/AOA protections in Normal Law or ADR failur procedures. There certainly isn’t a grounding of airplanes.   
Or how about this. How many people have died worldwide due to driver error, poor maintenance or failure to understand the very basic systems in the exact make and model of car that you drive daily since the Lion Air crash?  And you didn’t give two thoughts about crawling into it today. 
Fly the f’’ing airplane. Trim the f’ing airplane. Know your memory items and limitations cold.  Hand fly the airplane often. And maybe don’t be overly surprised when Arfrica’s premier airline staffed by a young Captain and 200 hour FO digs a hole because they didn’t do the above. 

This. The idiot pilots are at fault.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

3 hours ago, Brisketexan said:

All that you said boils down to this.

Almost ANY major calamity -- air crash, dam failure, whatever -- comes down to something like that, a sequence of factors, all of which had to happen for the failure to occur.  But the argument/response to that isn't "well, can't point the finger at factor 3, because of factors 1-2 and 4-5."  When you have a technical system that creates a higher risk of pilot error, leading to a higher risk of crash, that's a bad thing.  I don't know how to state it much more plainly than that.  Yes, you're right, the plane STILL shouldn't crash when this issue occurs....but the LIKELIHOOD of it crashing goes up when it occurs.

If the manufacturer can remove that enhanced likelihood with a technical fix.....then that's what should happen.  And if it was KNOWN, that should have happened a while ago.  If there's a weak link, and it can be removed, it should be removed.

None of this excuses pilot error, poor training, etc.  All factors that can be addressed should be addressed.  But it's dead-wrong to skip over and just say 'hey, have top-notch pilots who are on their A-game, and this won't happen."  

The problem is that many failures followed by incorrect pilot action  can lead to crashes. MCAS is not the problem. In fact, it’s going to save lives one day when some other third world crew gets a Max in a stall situation. Guaranteed. 

You cant keep engineering fixes into aircraft to address every failure that can lead to a crash. 

Maybe it’s been addressed, but it’s my understanding that a super cooled hydraulic rudder actuator can still suffer from control reversal in a 737 resulting in the exact opposite control inputs being applied by a pilot. This killed a slew of people in a crash years ago. The fix wasn’t a reworked system, but pilot awareness and training. 

Airbus didn’t rewrite its low speed/high AOA software when Air France dumped a 330 off Brazil. Increased pilot awareness and training was the fix, and a procedure was added that (in watered down format) says turn the automation off, set TOGA or climb power and pitch to this attitude based on your altitude, and created a chart for power and pitch to maintain level flight at a given altitude. That’s basic airmanship, but as you’ve seen basic airmanship is lacking in some locales.   They also didn’t rewrite their control input laws which sum the inputs from both sticks to the controls, and whose audible warning for doing so can be muted for more serious failures even though there will be other visual indications. One FO in the AF crash held full nose up nearly to the water canceling out the correct inputs from the other FO.

Like I said earlier, most procedures and rules are written in blood, and single failures followed by pilot error can lead to hull loss. Why a 737 is pitching erroneously  is irrelevant. The fix is the same. I’d agree with you if the pilots in questions had responded appropriately to those uncommanded nose down commands and still crashed the plane. 

Now, did Boeing screw up by not highlighting this programming addition with great emphasis for potential buyers?  Yes, they absolutley should have mentioned that the plane would pitch down on its own if it detected a stall situation. But they probably also assumed that trained crews knew the long-standing procedure for dealing with uncommanded pitch inputs. 

I’ll put my family on a US Max today.  And I might mention that if I were to accept an aircraft written up for multiple uncommanded pitch events with no real mx resolution  like both the aircraft in question that I would, after reviewing the log with my partner, probably have a little flight deck discussion to review what to do in case it happened again.  

Edited by Bobby_Batronic
  • Like 5
Link to comment
Share on other sites


This. The idiot pilots are at fault.


And this could be anticipated. A predictable complication of bad design. “Fuck, the pilots should be better! They screwed the pooch.” Same bullshit we’ve had since the first computers were put in aircraft.

Bad design. Inadequate testing. Poor communication. Greed.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Bobby, you sound like a top-notch pilot. I’d be happy having you flying on my next flight.

My only point is this: not every pilot is as good as Bobby. And Boeing knows this. If they can take a simple step that significantly reduces the effect of a particular pilot error, they should take that step.

You don’t build cars for Mario Andretti. You build them for the average driver. You don’t build planes for Sully and Bobby...you build them for mediocre pilots, which are a statistical certainty.

  • Like 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I’m just a professional pilot and no more. Better than some and worse than others, but I do try to be good at what I do. 

The longstanding joke with the Airbus is that it was built with inexperienced pilots from developing countries in mind. In many ways it’s flying for dummies. In other ways it’s so dummed down that it takes away airmanship if you let it. With regard to that I find the 737 is the superior plane. 

I was a checkairman as my last stop and was particularly unforgiving of people who didn’t know where to stick the nose and put the power to get the desired result. Airmanship. We had a process for interacring with the automation called CAMI. First we would Confirm an input with the other pilot, and once that was done we’d Activate the change. Then we would Monitor to make sure the plane was doing what we wanted and Intervene if it wasn’t. That last part is what I harped on because I would watch guys stop flying the plane or worse just throw the autopilot on without methodically building up the lateral, vertical and speed parameters. They would abdicate their role as pilot first, and then get their asses in a sling when the autopilot went on a walk about while they were digging in a QRH or briefing an approach or whatnot. There is no excuse for a pilot experienced in an aircraft type to not know pitch and power for pretty much all phases of flight. 

The other thing I was unforgiving of was not knowing memory items and limitations cold. These aren’t hard. They’re there to keep you safe, and to keep the plane flying so that you can work the problem once you’ve got things stabilized to a degree.  And not a few are written in blood. I review them before every trip. It only takes about 10 minutes so it’s not like it’s some big effort. 

None of the current narrowbody designs in use today are younger than 40 years old save the C series/A220. They are all fairly modified to keep current with the times and their expanding roles. The 737 added a tail bumper as it was lengthened for tail strikes. The Max has extended main gear and repositioned motors to accommodate bigger fans. The A321 doesn’t have enough wing and doesn’t land with full flaps (25 degrees compared to 40) like the 320-319. The NEO only has 18 inches of clearance between the nacelle and the ground. Pilots have had to learn and modify their behaviors to a degree as each airframe is developed. The Max is no different, and I’ve not heard a single complaint from friends who’ve flown it with regard to its handling. In other words, it’s a good flying plane like most Boeings. A very similar system to the MCAS is installed on Airbuses and no one is losing their minds over it, largely because the public doesn’t know about it. Both systems have procedures for dealing with their failures that prevent what happened in Africa and the Far East from leading to crashes.

You’re ultimately going to get your wish with this, but it shouldn’t have happened in the first place. It’s easy to Monday morning QB this stuff and say what you would and wouldn’t have done differently, but there were plenty of warning signs available to both crews to cue them into the fact that pitch issues might arise, and that they may have to use that memory item every Boeing pilot has known by heart for 50+ years. Particularly the second crew who should have really had it foremost in their minds. 

Edited by Bobby_Batronic
  • Like 6
Link to comment
Share on other sites

4 hours ago, Gil Bang said:

 

 

Drinkin' buddy of mine is retired AA 777 Captain.  He said that he's been in the AA sim with a lot of foreign pilots, and that the Saudis were head-and-shoulders above everybody else.  He said he'd fly a Saudi airline without hesitation. 

Because they never have to practice landing?

  • Like 4
  • Haha 3
Link to comment
Share on other sites

59 minutes ago, Bobby_Batronic said:

There is no excuse for a pilot experienced in an aircraft type to not know pitch and power for pretty much all phases of flight. 

This basically sums it up. When 1+1 is not equaling 2... fly the plane. 

Edited by Telegraph_it
  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I appreciate the pilots who are seeing the pilot incompetence in handling these situations, but as an engineer I see the engineering incompetence in the situation existing in the first place.

The pilots are making it sound like AoA sensors supplying bad information happens way too often. I obviously don't know all the difficulties in designing this piece of instrumentation but y'all are making it sound like it's something every pilot sees in the course of their careers. If aviation is going to get more and more automated, which it will, something as fundamental as the computer getting accurate information on the plane's angle of attack should be nearly errorless.

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I’ve had it happen twice in my career. Both times resulted in our firing of the autopilot.  

Having said that, it’s not about getting AOA errors. It’s about knowing what to do when the plane makes uncommanded movements. You don’t have to know why it’s doing it. Just how to respond, and then go digging for steps and answers in the reference handbook once you’ve stabilized the problem.  

Its understandbale that the Lion Air crew, for example, didn’t know that opposite trim or a flap selection would interrupt the MCAS inputs. MCAS wasn’t in their manuals. Hitting the stab cutout switches for uncommanded pitch most assuredly was. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I appreciate the pilots who are seeing the pilot incompetence in handling these situations, but as an engineer I see the engineering incompetence in the situation existing in the first place.

The pilots are making it sound like AoA sensors supplying bad information happens way too often. I obviously don't know all the difficulties in designing this piece of instrumentation but y'all are making it sound like it's something every pilot sees in the course of their careers. If aviation is going to get more and more automated, which it will, something as fundamental as the computer getting accurate information on the plane's angle of attack should be nearly errorless.
No doubt. Boeing's been putting lipstick on this pig for far too long, but it's a tank. I can't recall many systems malfunctions in my 10,000 hours in type, but to have a single source AoA input to this new system reeks of cutting corners, and I doubt the low level engineers originally designed it this way.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

You can’t engineer out all problems, you just move the problems on some cases. Apparently the MCAS is one of the cases. To eliminate the potential pilot error of a stall caused by a high angle of attack, this system was put in place. Cool. But now there’s the issue of pilot error when the system doesn’t function correctly. 

So which problem is less likely, and which problem would you prefer the pilots deal with?  

My uneducated guess is that deactivating the MCAS and flying the plane is easier than recovering from a low altitude stall...if the pilot knows what they are doing. But if a pilot knows what they’re doing, would they stall the rig in the first place?

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.



×
×
  • Create New...